ROSS, KEEN & CO., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
JOSEPH L. STEEN, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an attachment proceeding, holding that an affidavit in support of an attachment must state the fact that a debt is actually due based on direct knowledge rather than information and belief, as required by statute.
The court held that under Florida's attachment statute, the fact of indebtedness and that it is actually due must be stated based on something more convincing than information and belief or hearsay. The affidavit was insufficient because it did not meet this statutory requirement.
“If one fact is required to be stated directly, and another may be stated on information and belief, there is no mistaking the intent of the statute that the first fact must be averred on something more than information and belief.”
Establishes the court's interpretation that statutory language distinguishing direct statement from information and belief reflects clear legislative intent regarding evidentiary standards.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoss, Keen & Co. sought to attach the property of Joseph L. Steen as a debtor. The affidavit in support of the attachment stated the amount due and th…
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The Chiee-Justice delivered the opinion of the court.
In an affidavit to procure an attachment against the property of a debtor, the elements of positiveness as to knowledge, information or belief, separately or altogether, required by the statute, must be substantially included in its terms. If one fact is required to be stated directly, and another may be stated on information and belief, there is no mistaking the intent of the statute that the first fact must be averred on something more than information and belief. Our statute requires that the party applying for an attachment, his agent or attorney shall first make oath in writing that the amount demanded is actually due, and also that he has reason to believe that the debtor will fraudulently part with his property, or is removing, or about to remove, &c. It would be a perversion of the terms and impoi’t of the statute to hold that the amount of the debt and the fact that it is actually due could be stated on information and belief only.
The authorities, almost without exception, agree that under a like statute the fact of the indebtedness must be stated upon something more convincing than hearsay. Mitchell vs. Pitts, 61 Ala., 219, cited by appellants, and McNamara vs. Ellis, 14 Ind., 516, are the only cases we have been able to find which sustain the affidavit in the present case. Other cases in Alabama do not agree with it. Hall vs. Brazelton, 40 Ala., 406; Sims vs. Jacobson, 51 Ala., 186; Hall vs. Brazelton, 46 Ala., 359; Cobb vs. Force, 6 Ala., 468; Pickle’s Adm. vs. Ezzell, 27 Ala., 623.
The Louisiana ease cited, Bridges vs. Williams, 1 Martin, n. s., 98, is not at hand. The other case, Howell vs. Kingsbury, 15 Wis., 272, does not sustain the position contended for. In that case the affidavit stated the amount due, “ all of which is stated upon information and belief derived from and founded upon the written admission of •the defendants, now in deponent’s possession.” This was held to be sufficiently certain because the evidence producing the belief was such as would have been competent proof of the fact in a court of justice. We think this a proper rule in this State.
The books are full of the carcasses ot slain attachment suits iu which the statements in the affidavits are uponlnformation and belief, where the statute required facts to be shown by direct statement. See Drake on Att., 5 Ed., §§ 106, 108, and notes.
The affidavit in this case was insufficient, and upon this ground the attachment was properly dismissed.
As to the bond signed in the name of the partnership firm only, we have had occasion to examine the question at the present term, and our conclusion, upon authority, is that a bond so signed bound all the parties who had authorized or subsequently ratified the signing, either by deed or by parol, and that it was good under section 10 of the act of 1834. McClellan’s Dig., 113, sec. 15; Jeffreys & Stribling vs. Coleman, infra.
The judgment is affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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The Tanner & Delaney Engine Co. v. Hall & Mobley, 22 Fla. 391 (Fla. 1886)
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J. Pollock & Co. v. George R. Murray & Co., 38 Fla. 105 (Fla. 1896)…ould be authorized by parol, or ratified by parol, by the other partner. The authorities cited refer to the conditions under which one partner may bind the firm by executing bonds in the firm name. The bond in the case of Ross, Keen & Co. vs. Steen, 20 Fla. 443, was executed in a firm name by an attorney, and in the latter part of the opinion it is stated that the rule announced in Jeffreys vs. Coleman would apply. The point was not necessary to the decision, and there is no head note on the subject. Under…