FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, A STATE AGENCY, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE HOWARD GROSS, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND THE HONORABLE ARTHUR SNYDER, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services sought writs of mandamus to prevent two circuit court judges from committing sexual battery defendants to a state mental hospital treatment program as a condition of probation. The court held that specific statutory provisions governing sex offender treatment program admissions supersede a judge's general discretion in setting probation conditions, and granted the writs of certiorari to quash the commitment orders.
The court held that specific statutes governing sex offender residential treatment program admissions (sections 917.012 and 917.017) take precedence over the general discretionary powers granted to judges in setting probation conditions (section 948.03(3)), and the trial judges exceeded their authority in committing the defendants without following the statutory procedure.
[1] A specific statute governing the entry of sex offenders into residential treatment programs takes precedence over a general statute granting judges broad powers in formul…
[2] Judges may not order a sex offender committed to a residential treatment program as a condition of probation without following the statutory procedures for offender eligi…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a statute dealing specifically with a particular subject matter takes precedence over another statute covering the same and other subjects in general terms”
Establishes the statutory construction principle that resolves the conflict between specific sex offender commitment statutes and general probation authority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo defendants were adjudicated guilty of sexual battery in separate criminal proceedings before Judges Gross and Snyder. The judges withheld sentence…
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NESBITT, Judge.
In separate criminal proceedings, the respondent judges adjudicated defendants guilty of the offense of sexual battery, withheld sentences, and ordered that the defendants be committed to the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at South Florida State Hospital as a special condition of probation.
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) petitioned this court for writs of mandamus directing the circuit judges to refrain from enforcing the commitment orders.
Section 917.017, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that HRS shall not permit entry of a sex offender into any of its residential sex offender treatment programs unless the procedure specified in Section 917.012, Florida Statutes (1981), is followed with respect to that sex offender. Section 917.012 clearly provides that a sex offender must have been sentenced before entering the residential treatment program and that the Department of Corrections and HRS shall jointly determine the eligibility of sex offenders for such programs.
It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the entry of their orders was justified by the broad powers granted to judges in formulating conditions of probation. § 948.03(3), Fla.Stat. (1981). This argument fails on the principle of statutory construction which dictates that a statute dealing specifically with a particular subject matter takes precedence over another statute covering the same and other subjects in general terms. Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959); Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Florida Board of Regents, 314 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Panzavecchia v. State, 201 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
As so construed, Sections 917.012 and 917.017, dealing specifically with the entry of sexual offenders into residential treatment programs, govern over the general discretionary powers afforded trial judges by Section 948.03(3) regarding probationers.
Because the petitions for mandamus seek to quash orders which have already been entered, and because the challenged orders depart from the essential requirements of law in that they constitute an unwarranted judicial incursion into the executive function and authority conferred upon HRS, State ex rel. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Sepe, 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); see Dade County v. Baker, 237 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), we treat HRS’ applications as petitions for common law certiorari, Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c), award the writs of certiorari, and quash the orders under review.
It is so ordered.
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Dorman v. State, 457 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…2 (Fla.1983). However, Dorman argues that the committee note erroneously assumes that the sentencing court has the power to order a defendant be placed in the MDSO program. Citing to Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Gross, 421 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), Dorman contends that the court can only recommend that the Department of Corrections afford a defendant this treatment. Although we do not disagree with Dor-man’s interpretation of Gross and chapter 917, we point out that the ju…
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Singletary v. Acosta, 659 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…ly lacks authority to regulate the treatment and placement of a sentenced defendant in the prison system. See Art. II, § 3, Fla.Const. (1968); Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla.2d DCA 1983); Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Sews. v. Gross, 421 So. 2d 44 (Fla.3d DCA 1982); State ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Sepe, 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla.3d DCA 1974). After remand, the trial judge shall enter sentence in the usual form.…
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Dep't OF Juv. Just. v. J.R., 710 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…to regulate the placement of a sentenced defendant in the prison system, citing Article II, Section 3, Florida Constitution (1968), Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Gross, 421 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and State, ex rel. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Sepe, 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We also find that the notice of appeal was not subject to the 15-day commencement period for appeals by the state pr…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kerfert Butler Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959)
- State v. Sepe, 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Coy Lee Doty v. State, 201 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
- Dade Cnty. v. Honorable Paul Baker, 237 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- The Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Fla. Bd. OF Regents & Dr. Benjamin L. Perry, Jr., 314 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)