FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, SELF-INSURED, APPELLANT,
v.
HOWARD HAYCRAFT, APPELLEE
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Florida Power & Light Company appeals workers' compensation orders awarding the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and a $17,500 attorney's fee. The court reverses the TTD award because the claim was mature at the initial hearing and should have been raised then, not in a subsequent modification petition, and reduces the attorney's fee to $15,000 due to insufficient findings of fact justifying the deviation from the statutory fee schedule.
The court reversed the TTD benefits award because the claim was mature at the time of the initial hearing and should have been raised then, not later in a modification petition; piecemeal litigation of mature claims is not permitted. The court affirmed the finding of changed physical condition. The court reduced the attorney's fee from $17,500 to $15,000 because the deputy commissioner failed to provide specific findings explaining how the statutory fee factors justified deviation from the statutory schedule.
[1] Workers' compensation claims for temporary total disability benefits mature at the time of injury and must be claimed at the initial hearing if ripe.
[2] Piecemeal litigation of mature workers' compensation claims after their initial determination is not permitted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A claim for TTD benefits matured at the time the claimant was injured. Only PTD or PPD benefits do not mature until claimant reaches maximum medical improvement.”
Establishes the legal principle that TTD claims mature immediately upon injury and should be raised at the initial hearing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe claimant was injured and sought workers' compensation benefits. An initial hearing was held on June 16, 1978. The claimant later filed a petition …
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THOMPSON, Judge.
The self-insured employer appeals two workers’ compensation orders. One order was entered pursuant to a petition for modification and awarded claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. The other order awarded claimant’s attorney a fee of $17,500.
We agree the deputy commissioner erred in awarding TTD benefits and reverse the modification order in part. We modify the attorney’s fee order. The issue of whether the claimant was entitled to TTD benefits was ripe for determination at the time of the initial hearing on June 16, 1978 and the claimant should have made any claim for TTD or temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits at that time. A claim for TTD benefits matured at the time the claimant was injured. Only PTD or PPD benefits do not mature until claimant reaches maximum medical improvement. Claimant should have made any claims he might have had for TTD or TPD in the pre-trial stipulation and at the June 16,1978 hearing. No claim for TTD benefits was made in the pre-trial stipulation. Claims for compensation benefits should be determined at a hearing if they are mature and only the determination of immature claims should be postponed until further hearing when they are ripe. The piecemeal litigation of claims after maturity is not permitted. Hunt v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp., 410 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
The award of TTD benefits is therefore reversed.
We find no reversible error in the deputy’s finding of a changed physical condition and in using psychiatric testimony to support the modification.
Appellant contends that the $17,500 attorney’s fee awarded the claimant’s attorney is excessive. In his brief, appellee’s attorney agrees that the fee is in excess of the approximately $15,000 statutory fee and states that he would not be adverse to a reduction if warranted by the facts and the law. In his order the deputy commissioner states that he has taken into consideration all the factors set forth in § 440.34, Fla. Stat., Lee Engineering & Construction Co. v. Fellows, 209 So. 2d 454 (Fla.1968), and Orange County School Board v. Van Zant, 400 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and carefully lists all of the factors that he considered, including the number of hours expended by claimant’s attorney.
However, without stating the number of hours expended or without stating the effect, if any, of any of the factors considered he then found a reasonable fee to be $17,500. The mere recitation of the factors considered, without a finding as to which of those factors, if any, should affect the determination of the fee and without an explanation as to why they affect determination of the fee is of no assistance to this court in determining whether the deputy commissioner arrived at a reasonable fee. Since no basis for a deviation from the fee schedule has been shown in this order, we find that a reasonable fee for claimant’s attorney in this case is $15,000.
Accordingly, the order awarding claimant’s attorney a fee is modified to provide for a $15,000 fee instead of a $17,500 fee.
The modification order is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The order awarding claimant’s attorney a fee is modified to provide for a $15,000 fee and, as modified, is affirmed.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and SHIVERS, J., concur.
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Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Matilde Capin and the Division of Workers' Compensation, 450 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…e amount of time expended in prosecuting the claim, 49½ hours. The order does not elaborate on this fact or make any attempt to justify a fee which is significantly in excess of the statutory sliding scale. Cf. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Godek, supra. See also Roundtree Transportation, Inc. v. Godek, 430 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (same case as Godek, supra, on appeal after new order on remand). The order is reversed and remanded and the deputy commissione…
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Fumigation Dep't & Claims Ctr. v. Pearson, 559 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the order should generally reflect the deputy’s consideration of these factors, and must indicate the basis for a fee award which departs from the statutory percentage formula. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In the present case the deputy awarded an amount which is nearly three times that which would result from the statutory percentage formula. Although the attorney’s “time and labor” is one of the statutory factors to be considere…
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Boynton Landscape & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dickinson, 752 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…cluded by application of the doctrine of res judicata. E.g., Artigas v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 622 So. 2d 1846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Department of Transportation v. Greene, 599 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Here, the claimant did not file his claim that he was entitled to recalculation of the social security offset and a refund of all offsets previously taken because the employer and carrier did not have sufficient information from…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gray v. Attorney Gen., State of Fla. and/or State Attorney, Cir. Court, Volusia Cnty., Fla., 209 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1968)
- Hunt v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 410 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. & the Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. van Zant, 400 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)