MAKTOS ET AL.
v.
MATTHEWS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the appellants were legally held for extradition because they failed to prove they were not fugitives from North Carolina.
Appellants were ordered extradited to North Carolina by the District Court. They sought release via habeas corpus, claiming they were not fugitives fr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fugitive From Justice cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, after a hearing, ordered the appellants extradited to North Carolina and committed them to the custody of the United States Marshal.1 Pursuant to their petition, a writ of habeas corpus issued to test the legality of their detention. This appeal is from the order discharging the writ.
Appellants say they were not in North Carolina when the crime was alleged to have been committed, and so were not fugitives from the justice of that state. If so, they were entitled to be released from custody. If not, they were legally held. That was the only issue presented to .the trial court.
The North Carolina indictment, a copy of which accompanied the governor’s requisition, charged their presence there and, being prima facie proof thereof, was determinative of the issue unless the appellants proved the contrary.2 As they offered no evidence that they were not in' the demanding state at the time alleged in the indictment, the district judge could do nothing but discharge the writ.
The appellants say in their brief, “The Court refused to hear any evidence as to fugitivity and as a result the writ was dis charged and the petition dismissed.” We find nothing in the record to support that statement; on the other hand, we observe that the district judge invited them to make such proof.
Affirmed.
. The Chief Judge of the District Court has executive authority .in the District of Columbia in requisition proceedings similar to that of the governors of the several states. 23 D.C.Code (1940) § 401; Lee Won Sing v. Cottone, 1941, 74 App.D.C. 374, 123 F. 2d 169; Reed v. Colpoys, 1938, 69 App.D.C. 163, 99 F. 2d 396; Hill v. Dorsey, 1927, 57 App.D.C. 305, 22 F. 2d 1003.
. Levy v. Splain, 1920, 50 App.D.O. 31, 267 F. 333.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Earnest Frank Brown, Sr. v. Ward, 275 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
-
Hoffman v. United States, 403 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
Authorities Cited
- Sing v. Cottone, 123 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
- Reed v. Colpoys, 99 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1938)
- Hill v. Dorsey, 22 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1927)