DONALD EDWARD HAMPTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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This case concerns an appeal from a resentencing where the appellant argued he should receive credit for time served in prison under vacated sentences. The appellate court affirmed the resentencing, holding that while credit is due, the calculation of prison time credit is the responsibility of the Department of Corrections, not the trial judge.
The appellant is entitled to credit for time spent in prison under the vacated sentences against his new sentences. However, the responsibility for calculating this credit lies with the Department of Corrections, not the trial judge.
[1] A trial court does not err in modifying a split sentence to a sentence of confinement only after the original sentence has been vacated.
[2] A defendant is entitled to credit against a resentence for time spent in prison under a vacated sentence for the same charge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While we agree that appellant is entitled to credit against the first of his two new sentences for the time he spent in prison under the first of his two old sentences on the same charge and conviction, we do not agree that the burden was on the trial judge to determine the credit for such prison time because that is the proper function of the Department of Corrections, which is charged with the function of discharging a prisoner from its custody at the proper time.”
Establishes the entitlement to credit for time served under vacated sentences but assigns the calculation responsibility to the Department of Corrections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant was resentenced after his original sentences were vacated on appeal. He received credit for pre-sentence jail time but argued he should …
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COWART, Judge.
This is an appeal from a resentencing after appellant’s original two sentences were vacated on appeal.1
We have examined the record and find the trial judge adequately extended allocution and did not err in modifying the split sentence to a sentence of confinement only. See Lowery v. State, 418 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) [1982 FLW 1846],
Appellant also complains that while the trial judge specifically gave him credit against the first of the two new sentences for the 126 days he spent in the county jail before his original sentence, as directed by section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1981), the trial judge did not give him credit against his new sentences for the time he had spent in prison under the vacated sentences. While we agree that appellant is entitled to credit against the first of his two new sentences for the time he spent in prison under the first of his two old sentences on the same charge and conviction, we do not agree that the burden was on the trial judge to determine the credit for such prison time because that is the proper function of the Department of Corrections, which is charged with the function of discharging a prisoner from its custody at the proper time. The Department of Corrections has and maintains adequate records (§§ 944.17, 944.18, 944.25, Fla.Stat. (1981)), from which it can determine that sentences imposed at resentencing relate to the same crime and charges as did old sentences and calculate the total amount of time properly credited against sentences and commitments. That calculation involves a consideration of the time spent between sentencing and delivery to the actual custody of the Department (see § 921.161(2), Fla.Stat. (1981)) as well as grants and forfeitures of gain time (see § 944.275 and 944.28, Fla. Stat. (1981)), and other matters not availa ble to the trial judge from the files and records of the court and its executive officer, the sheriff.
AFFIRMED.
COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. . See Hampton v. State, 399 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Desue v. State, 605 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ime served and thereafter permit the department to make such calculation. See Wilson v. State, 603 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Rice v. State, 563 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Shelby v. State, 554 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Hampton v. State, 421 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In regard to Desue’s final argument, the state concedes that the trial court erred by failing to make the written order conform to its oral pronouncement that Desue violated probation by committing petit theft and not armed rob…
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Moore v. State, 634 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…res that credit must be provided for a specified period of time provided for in the sentence, the department of corrections can properly calculate the specific amount of days Moore spent in jail while waiting to be transported. See Hampton v. State, 421 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (though defendant is entitled to credit against the first of these two sentences for the time he spent in prison under the first of his two old sentences on the same charge and conviction, it is the proper function of the departm…
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Rivera v. State, 638 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…redit him for all the time he served since November of 1986, it did not do so in the written order. [*149] We hold that Rivera should have received credit for the almost seven years he spent in prison on his original sentences. See Hampton v. State, 421 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (agreeing that the appellant was entitled to credit against his new sentences for time he spent in prison under the vacated sentences); Craig v. State, 608 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (defendant was entitled to credit for time…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lowery v. State, 418 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Hampton v. State, 399 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)