MICHAEL ANTHONY DEL DUCA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a vehicular homicide conviction because the defendant's incriminating statements were obtained in violation of the Edwards v. Arizona rule: after the defendant invoked his right to counsel through his attorney, police reinitiated interrogation without counsel present and obtained a purported waiver based only on Miranda warnings.
The court held that the defendant's statements must be suppressed because under Edwards v. Arizona, once an accused invokes the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver cannot be established merely by showing the accused responded to police-initiated interrogation after being re-advised of Miranda rights. The state failed to establish a valid waiver under the Edwards standard.
[1] Once an accused has invoked the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that the…
[2] An accused who has expressed a desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not to be subjected to further interrogation until counsel has been made available,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“once an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that the accused responded to police initiated interrogation after being again advised of his Miranda rights.”
Establishes the Edwards rule that governs waiver of right to counsel after invocation
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDel Duca was arrested at the scene of an accident and given Miranda warnings. He was taken to a hospital and then to jail. At the jail, approximately …
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DANAHY, Judge.
Since the defendant’s trial and conviction on charges of vehicular homicide, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). That decision requires us to reverse.
At the scene of the accident giving rise to the charges against the defendant, the defendant was placed under arrest and fully advised of his Miranda rights. He was taken to a hospital for treatment of injuries and then transported the same evening to jail. At the jail, approximately five hours after the accident, Officer Price visited the defendant, reminded him of his Miranda rights, and questioned him regarding the accident. The defendant made inculpatory statements. His motion to suppress those statements as evidence against him was denied on the ground that he waived his Miranda rights by his willingness to talk to Officer Price.
The state concedes that prior to the questioning of the defendant by Officer Price at the jail, the defendant was visited by his attorney. The attorney informed the booking officer at the jail that he represented the defendant and did not want him questioned without the attorney’s presence. The defendant thus clearly invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that once an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that the accused responded to police initiated interrogation after being again advised of his Miranda rights. The Court said that once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not to be subjected to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communications with the police.
The state failed to establish a valid waiver by the defendant of his right to have counsel present during interrogation, under the standard set forth in Edwards. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Silling v. State, 414 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
OTT, C.J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992)…e booking officer at the jail that he represented the defendant and did not want him questioned without the attorney’s presence. The defendant thus clearly invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Del Duca v. State, 422 So. 2d 40, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (citing Edwards). Nowhere does the majority address this holding or purport to overrule it. I agree there are some limited exceptions to the general principle that an attorney can invoke a client’s Edwards right with regard t…
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Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1992)…Cotter, 765 F. 2d 1245, 1246 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 1523, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986); United States v. Lilia, 534 F.Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y.1982); United States v. Callabrass, 458 F.Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Del Duca v. State, 422 So. 2d 40, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). I respectfully dissent. BARKETT, J., concurs. . The State’s brief contains the following: Appellant had been represented by the Public Defender’s Office.... He and his public defender had signed a form styled “Edwards Not…
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Anthony v. Schmitt, 557 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…to testify. Mr. Del Duca had consumed alcohol prior to this accident and was charged with manslaughter because of Mrs. Anthony’s death. After one successful appeal, he was tried and convicted of reckless driving in June 1983. See Del Duca v. State, 422 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Del Duca v. State, 459 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). This court affirmed the conviction in October 1984.1 [*658] Between October 1984 and March 1986, the record reflects that this case was set for trial on two occasions. A tria…
Authorities Cited
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981)
- Silling v. State, 414 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)