JOEL EVERS, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF HELEN PARKS, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
PETER ZELYK, JR. AND SHELIA ZELYK, APPELLEES
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The estate's personal representative appealed a trial court's revocation of a will based on undue influence by two principal beneficiaries. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that a presumption of undue influence arose and that the will's proponents failed to overcome it.
The appellate court affirmed that the trial court's conclusion of a presumption of undue influence was supported by substantial, competent evidence, even without specific findings on the two required elements, because the record demonstrated both a confidential relationship between the beneficiaries and testatrix and active procurement of the will's execution.
[1] A presumption of undue influence in the execution of a will may be established by evidence supporting a confidential relationship between beneficiaries and the testatrix,…
[2] Specific findings detailing the existence of a confidential relationship and active procurement are not always essential to support a conclusion that a presumption of und…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“From the aforementioned findings the Court concludes that a presumption of undue influence is raised.”
The trial court's conclusion that undue influence was presumed based on its findings of fact.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHelen Parks executed a will that named two individuals as principal beneficiaries. The trial court found that these two beneficiaries exerted undue in…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Joel Evers, as personal representative of the estate of Helen Parks, deceased, appeals from an order of the trial court granting a petition for revocation of probate of a will. The trial court’s order amounts to a final judgment which found that the testatrix executed the will as a result of the undue influence exerted by two of the principal beneficiaries of the will. The ten page order of the trial court sets forth numerous findings of fact surrounding the execution of the will by the testatrix. The court concluded: “From the aforementioned findings the Court concludes that a presumption of undue influence is raised.” The trial court did not make specific findings that the presumption of undue influence arose because of (1) a confidential relationship existing between the two beneficiaries and the testatrix, and (2) the beneficiaries’ active procurement of the execution of the will.
Such specific findings are not essential if we are able to determine from the trial court’s other findings and from the record that the conclusion of a presumption of undue influence is supported by evidence that supports the existence of (1) a confidential relationship, and (2) active procurement in the execution of the will. In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1971); Williamson v. Kirby, 379 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). While we might not necessarily have reached the same conclusion, after an exhaustive review of the record, we determine that the trial court’s conclusion of the existence of a presump tion of undue influence is supported by substantial, competent evidence. The trial court’s further finding that the proponents of the will have “failed to produce testimony to overcome or equalize the presumption of undue influence” is likewise supported by the record.
AFFIRMED.
OTT, C.J., and RYDER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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In re The Est. of Helena Hatcher v. Dodd, 439 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…due influence and relieved the appellees of having to rebut the presumption of undue influence. Cripe v. Atlantic First National Bank of Daytona Beach, 422 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1982); In Re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1971); Evers v. Zelyk, 422 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); In Re Estate of Lamberson, 407 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Meth v. Sparaga, 406 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We find that the trial court erred in holding the West Virginia will valid and we remand this cause to the trial co…
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In re Est. OF Mamie McCOY v. Milton, 445 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…. For the reasons previously stated, we REVERSE and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. SCHEB and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . § 90.602, Fla.Stat. (1981). . See In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1971); Evers v. Zelyk, 422 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 430 So. 2d 450 (1983). . While the dead man’s statute, of course, disqualifies an interested person from testifying as to his oral communications with the decedent, it does not prohibit him from testi…
Authorities Cited
- In re Est. of Coketine Bray Carpenter v. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971)
- Frederick v. State, 379 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)