ROBERT COLLINS, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Collins appeals the Florida Parole and Probation Commission's establishment of his presumptive parole release date, challenging the commission's designation of his murder conviction as his present offense of conviction rather than his North Carolina assault convictions. The court affirms the commission's decision, holding that the administrative rules required use of the murder conviction because the new assault offenses did not result in commitment to the Department of Corrections.
The commission did not err. Under Florida Administrative Code Rules 23-19.02(2)(a) and (b), persons whose parole is revoked after conviction for a new felony offense who are committed to the Department of Corrections are treated as new admissions; however, because Collins' new assault offenses did not result in commitment to the Department of Corrections but rather his murder conviction necessitated his return to departmental control, the commission properly used the murder conviction as the present offense of conviction.
[1] A parole commission must treat an individual as a "new admission" when their parole is revoked due to a new felony or misdemeanor offense, recalculating guidelines based…
[2] A parole commission is not required to use a new offense of conviction for aggravation purposes when recalculating a presumptive parole release date if the new offenses d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Persons whose parole is revoked after conviction for a new felony [or misdemeanor] offense, and who are committed to the Department of Corrections will be considered under these guidelines as a new admission. The Commission will consider the person's previous convictions in computing the risk level of the inmate. The Commission will recalculate the guidelines matrix based on the new offense of conviction and using a new salient factor score”
The administrative rule relied upon by both Collins and the commission, which requires use of the new offense as the present offense only if the new offense resulted in commitment to the Department of Corrections
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCollins was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 for first-degree murder. He was paroled in December 1970, revoked in February 1974, and paroled aga…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Collins appeals from the Florida Parole and Probation Commission’s establishment of his presumptive parole release date. He argues the commission erred in its designation of his present offense of conviction. We affirm.
In 1964, Collins was sentenced to life for murder in the first degree. He was initially released on parole in December, 1970, which parole was revoked in February, 1974. Collins was again paroled in 1978. In 1979, however, he was convicted in North Carolina on three separate counts of assault, receiving suspended sentences in two instances and serving nine days in the third. Consequently, he was returned to Florida in May, 1980, and his parole was revoked.
Collins was interviewed on May 13, 1981, and a PPRD was set for October 18, 1994. As his present offense of conviction, the commission utilized the murder conviction. Although it considered the circumstances of his present parole violation, i.e., the assault convictions, the commission did not use those circumstances for aggravation purposes.
Collins argues that the commission was required to consider the North Carolina convictions as his present offense of conviction. Rules 23-19.02(2)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, cited by Collins and followed by the commission, do not support Collins’ position. Those rules provide:
Persons whose parole is revoked after conviction for a new felony [or misdemeanor] offense, and who are committed to the Department of Corrections will be considered under these guidelines as a new admission. The Commission will consider the person’s previous convictions in computing the risk level of the inmate. The Commission will recalculate the guidelines matrix based on the new offense of conviction and using a new salient factor score, (emphasis added)
The problem here is simply that Collins’ new offenses, for which his parole was revoked, did not result in his commitment to the Department of Corrections. Rather, his murder conviction, from which he was on parole, necessitated his return to the department’s control. The commission therefore had no other choice than to treat Collins as a “new admission” on that basis and recalculate his PPRD utilizing the murder conviction as his present offense of conviction.
Collins’ ex post facto challenge is without merit. Lopez v. FPPC, 410 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
The commission’s action is affirmed.
MILLS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.