MARIELISE WAGNER, FORMERLY MARIELISE WAGNER MACK, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
HENRY MACK, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLLANT; MARIELISE WAGNER MACK, APPELLANT, V. HENRY MACK, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the wife's motion to set aside a post-judgment settlement agreement in a dissolution of marriage case, finding clear evidence of voluntariness and no abuse of discretion.
A post-judgment settlement agreement in a dissolution case will not be set aside absent clear and convincing evidence of overreaching, fraud, coercion, or deceit, and the trial court's discretionary decision to deny such a motion will be affirmed when supported by evidence of voluntariness.
[1] A post-judgment settlement agreement in a dissolution of marriage case requires clear and convincing evidence of overreaching, fraud, coercion, or deceit to be set aside,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter entry of a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage case, the parties entered into a post-judgment settlement agreement while the wife's appe…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage case as consolidated with an appeal relating to a motion to set aside a post-judgment settlement agreement. After entry of the final judgment, the appellant/wife filed a notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending and the final judgment was unsuperseded, the parties entered into a post judgment settlement agreement. Thereafter, the wife moved to set aside the agreement asserting duress and other grounds. An evidentiary hearing occurred on the motion to set aside and the trial court denied the motion and ordered the parties to comply with the agreement. In a situation such as this, evidence of over-reaching, fraud, coercion, or deceit must be clear and convincing. Veiock v. Veiock, 391 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The decision of the trial court in granting or denying the motion to set aside a settlement rests on the sound discretion of that court. Hartley v. Hartley, 134 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). In the instant case, there was clear evidence in support of the voluntary nature of the settlement agreement between the parties and the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in failing to set it aside. All other arguments by appellant on this issue are without merit. We affirm the order denying the motion to set aside settlement. The parties are thus bound by their post judgment settlement and all issues as to the judgment are rendered moot.
AFFIRMED.
DOWNEY, BERANEK and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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Kozich v. Kozich, 501 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…een them by agreement at any time and an agreement settling all issues in the case is binding not only upon the parties but also upon the court.” This applies with equal force to a settlement made after judgment has been entered. See Wagner v. Mack, 422 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 990 (Fla.1983). To be distinguished from the foregoing, in this context, would be a judgment affecting not only the husband and wife but also the attorney under circumstances activating the right to enfor…
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Seabird Props., Inc. v. Villages OF Seaport Condo., 696 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…party, who shortly thereafter (three weeks), notified Seabird of his intention to be included in the class. Under these circumstances, I cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by electing to enforce the agreement. See Wagner v. Mack, 422 So. 2d 1045 ( Fla. 4th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 990 (Fla.1983); see also Villa v. Mumac Constr. Corp., 334 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). This is especially so because the law favors settlements. See Crosby Forrest Prods. Inc. v. Byers, 623 S…
Authorities Cited
- Jacquetta W. Hartley v. Hartley, 134 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Veiock v. Veiock, 391 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)