BARBARA L. WALES, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT E. WALES, APPELLEE
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Barbara Wales appealed a divorce judgment that incorporated an antenuptial agreement into the final judgment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the agreement had not been abandoned by the parties and upheld the property division terms specified in the agreement.
The trial court did not err. An antenuptial agreement may be abandoned only when one party's actions are inconsistent with the contract and the other party acquiesces, but abandonment is a question of fact. The trial court's factual findings are presumed correct and will not be disturbed absent incompetent evidence, and here there was competent evidence that the parties intended to live by the contract terms despite the husband's testimony regarding his knowledge of the jointly owned property.
[1] An antenuptial agreement may be abandoned by the parties when the actions of one party are inconsistent with the existence of the contract and such actions are acquiesced…
[2] The question of whether an antenuptial agreement has been abandoned is a question of fact.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An antenuptial agreement may be abandoned by the parties when the actions of one party are inconsistent with the existence of the contract and such actions are acquiesced in by the other party.”
Establishes the legal standard for when an antenuptial agreement can be abandoned
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 31, 1980, one day before their marriage, the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement providing that the wife would transfer the Jose …
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MILLS, Judge.
In this appeal from the trial court’s final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the wife contends that the trial court erred in incorporating the terms of an antenuptial agreement into the final judgment and in implicitly holding that the agreement had not been abandoned by the parties. We disagree.
On 31 January 1980, one day before their marriage, husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement which, among other things, provided that the wife was to transfer certain property located on Jose Terrace from her name into the joint names of her and her husband. The parties further agreed that all property acquired during the marriage would be jointly owned and that in the event of divorce, wife was to receive sole ownership of the Jose Terrace property and two-thirds of the property acquired during the marriage.
The parties acquired six parcels of real estate during the marriage. Three of these parcels were jointly owned, two of them were owned and mortgaged solely by the wife, and one of them was owned by the wife but mortgaged by the husband. The Jose Terrace property was never deeded by the wife as required by the agreement. In the final judgment of dissolution, the trial court upheld the antenuptial agreement, awarding the wife sole ownership of the Jose Terrace property and two-thirds ownership in the six parcels of real estate.
An antenuptial agreement may be abandoned by the parties when the actions of one party are inconsistent with the existence of the contract and such actions are acquiesced in by the other party. McMullen v. McMullen, 185 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). However, the question of whether there has been an abandonment is one of fact. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler, 172 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, § 484. Findings of the trial court come clothed with the presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed absent a showing that there was no competent evidence to sustain them. Baker v. Baker, 394 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Though the husband testified that he did not know any of the realty acquired during the marriage was jointly owned, there is still some evidence to indicate that the parties intended to live by the terms of the contract. Therefore, we decline to disturb the trial court’s finding on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and McCORD, J., concur.
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Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…of discretion in the trial court’s rulings on these claims. The trial court’s findings come clothed with the presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed absent a showing that there was no competent evidence to sustain them. Wales v. Wales, 422 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). A trial judge possesses broad authority to fashion an equitable distribution of the marital partners’ financial resources. Palmar v. Palmar, 402 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Hartley v. Hartley, 399 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 198…
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Pulitzer v. Pulitzer, 449 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…ce of the parties’ minor children be with the Husband. We affirm. The compelling findings and decision of the trial court were supported by abundant competent evidence. In such case, we are not authorized to substitute our judgment. Wales v. Wales, 422 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Baker v. Baker, 394 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Hunt v. Hunt, 394 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Murphy v. Murphy, 370 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The final judgment is, in all respects, AFFIRMED. [*372] HURLEY and WAL…
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Bell v. W.T. COX, Jr., 642 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…evidence presented at the trial. We find that the record supports the findings of fact and the exercise of discretion by the trial judge. The factual determinations of the trial court are clothed with the presumption of correctness. Wales v. Wales, 422 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). There was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings and the weight of such evidence is solely in the province of the trial court. See Clegg v. Chipola Aviation, Inc., 458 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Baker v. Baker, 394 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- McMULLEN v. McMULLEN, 185 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Butler, 172 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)