JAMES EDWARD JORDAN, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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James Jordan appealed the Florida Parole and Probation Commission's determination of his presumptive parole release date, challenging the commission's aggregation of his 1972 and 1975 robbery sentences. The court held that the commission erred in aggregating these offenses because Jordan was serving only one commitment, not multiple commitments as required by the aggregation rule.
The commission erred in aggregating the two robbery offenses because Jordan was serving only one commitment (the 1975 robbery sentence), as the 1972 sentence had expired and his most recent convictions did not result in a jail sentence. However, the commission did not violate the ex post facto clause by applying the new, harsher matrix time ranges to crimes committed before the new rules took effect.
[1] A parole commission may not aggregate offenses when a prisoner is not currently serving a commitment that was imposed before a prior commitment expired.
[2] A parole commission may not aggregate offenses for the purpose of determining a presumptive parole release date when the prior sentence has already expired.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“from our view of the record, it appears that Jordan is serving only one commitment, for the second robbery. The five year sentence imposed in 1972 has expired.”
Establishes that the aggregation rule does not apply because the prior commitment has terminated
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJordan was convicted of robbery and auto theft in 1972 and sentenced to five years; he was paroled in 1974. While on parole in 1975, he was convicted …
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Jordan, a prisoner at Cross City Correctional Institution, appeals from the commission’s determination of his presumptive parole release date. We agree with Jordan that the commission erred in aggregating certain offenses by invoking Fla.Admin. Code Rule 23-21.11.
In 1972, Jordan was convicted of robbery and auto theft and was sentenced to five years in prison. He was paroled in 1974. In 1975, while on parole, he was convicted of another robbery and was sentenced to 30 years. In 1981, he was again paroled. Within a week, Jordan was arrested for a traffic violation and for possession of a small amount of marijuana and paraphernalia. He was convicted and sentenced with fines but no jail time.
Of course, Jordan’s latest parole was revoked, and a new presumptive parole release date was set. The commission assigned 140 months to his 1972 robbery, and 140 months on the 1975 robbery. These two values were then added to determine the number of months of incarceration to be served before parole. The commission asserts that this procedure was proper because Rule 23-21.11(3)(b) requires “aggre gation” when a prisoner “is currently serving a commitment which was imposed before his prior commitment expired.” The commission contends that because the second robbery sentence was imposed before the first robbery sentence expired, then these two commitments should be scored and aggregated now.
However, from our view of the record, it appears that Jordan is serving only one commitment, for the second robbery. The five year sentence imposed in 1972 has expired. Further, Jordan’s most recent convictions did not result in a jail sentence, so they cannot be plotted on the commission’s matrices; that is, there simply is no present commitment that could be used to invoke Rule 23-21.11. Therefore, we must reverse the commission’s action in aggregating Jordan’s offenses.
However, the commission did not violate the ex post facto clause in applying the new, harsher matrix time ranges here, even though Jordan committed the robbery long before the new rules went into effect. Britt v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 417 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Overfield v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 418 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Accordingly, this cause is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions that the commission set a new presumptive parole release date for Jordan by striking 140 months from his period of incarceration before parole.
MILLS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
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Shannon v. Anabel P. Mitchell, 460 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…as the basis for its aggregation of unserved time from a former commitment, which it asserts had not yet expired when another commitment was imposed. While this is true, we agree with the holding in Jordan v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 423 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), that Rule 23-21.11 is not invoked when there is not a new commitment. Shannon had been released on parole long after both commitments of concern here. The commission aggregated them when calculating Shannon’s PPRD after his…
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Scott v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 533 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…WENTWORTH, Judge. Appellant sought mandamus in the lower court, contesting his presumptive parole release date. Jordan v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 423 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), and the other cases upon which appellant relies were decided prior to the amendment of Rule 23-21.-011(3), F.A.C., which now expressly authorizes the aggregation of expired commitments without intervening periods of discharge. A…
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Shannon v. R.V. Turner, 432 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…A 1983). We grant the writ and order the Commission to recompute petitioner’s PPRD without using his expired 1973 robbery sentence in aggregation. An expired sentence may not be used in aggregation. Jordan v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 423 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Writ Granted. HERSEY, HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur.…
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- Overfield v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Britt v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 417 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)