TERRENCE JAMES JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1982-12-14
No. 81-1234
Before BARKDULL and SCHWARTZ, JJ., and KAPNER, LEWIS, Associate Judge.
423 So. 2d 497 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1982)

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Synopsis

Terrence Johnson was convicted of rape and sentenced to 249 years in three consecutive terms. The appellate court affirmed his conviction but remanded the sentencing portion to clarify whether the trial court properly retained jurisdiction over parole decisions at the time of sentencing, as required by statute.


Holding

The conviction is affirmed. The sentencing is remanded to the trial court to determine whether the sentencing judge properly retained jurisdiction over parole review in accordance with Section 947.16(3) and Hayes v. State. Jurisdiction to retain parole review authority must be exercised at the time of sentencing and cannot be added after sentencing has been pronounced.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction will be affirmed if the arguments regarding the conviction are without merit.

[2] A case should be remanded when there is a discrepancy between the trial transcript and the clerk's notes or written order regarding the retention of jurisdiction.

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Key Quotes

“in any case of a person convicted of (certain felonies) ..., at the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order”

Establishes the statutory requirement that jurisdiction over parole review must be retained at the time of sentencing, not afterward

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Facts & Procedural History

Johnson was convicted of rape and sentenced to three consecutive terms totaling 249 years. There was a discrepancy in the record: the trial transcript…

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Opinion of the Court
KAPNER, LEWIS, Associate Judge.

KAPNER, LEWIS, Associate Judge.

Appellant, defendant below, was convicted of rape and was sentenced to three consecutive terms totaling 249 years. He appeals his conviction and that portion of the sentence wherein the trial court retained jurisdiction over the decision of the Parole Department. We find his arguments regarding his conviction to be without merit and, we, therefore affirm his conviction.

With respect to the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction, however, we believe the case should be remanded.

The transcript indicates the judge failed to retain jurisdiction, but the clerk’s notes and the written order of judgment and sentence indicate the opposite. Accordingly, we remand the case with directions to determine whether the sentencing judge properly retained jurisdiction at the time of sentencing in accordance with Section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1979)1 and Hayes v. State, 400 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).2 See Robinson v. State, 407 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Conviction affirmed. Sentence remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979):

[I]n any case of a person convicted of (certain felonies) ..., at the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order.... [emphasis supplied]

. Where a final conclusive judgment and sentence has been pronounced, the court may not recall the case and enhance the sentence .... Section 947.16(3) gives a trial court veto power over parole and thus has the effect of enhancement of a sentence.... After defendant had been sentenced the trial court was without jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing a parole commission release order. 400 So. 2d at 521.

Dissent
SCHWARTZ, Judge

SCHWARTZ, Judge

(dissenting in part).

In my view the trial court erroneously both refused to excuse a prospective juror for cause and permitted the admission of evidence concerning Johnson’s allegedly bad and violent character during the state’s rebuttal although the matter had not been fairly placed in issue by the defense. Hence, I would reverse for a new trial on the authority of Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981), as to the first point, and Bates v. State, 422 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), as to the second.

I do not disagree with the court’s treatment of the sentencing question.


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