RUBENSTEIN
v.
WILSON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ET AL.
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The court held that the district court should not have dismissed the habeas corpus petition based solely on the civilian employment contract, as further evidence is needed to determine the actual relationship with the Armed Forces.
Appellant, a civilian, was detained by the Air Force and sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that appel…
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BAZELON, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A critical issue raised is whether, during the period from June to November 1951, appellant was a person “accompanying” the Armed Forces within the meaning of Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.1 Appellees say that he was, that hence he is amenable to trial by court-martial for various offenses allegedly committed during that period, and is now lawfully restrained by the Air Force; appellant says that he was not a person “accompanying” the Armed Forces, that-he is improperly detained and a writ of habeas corpus should issue. The chief matter of record bearing on this issue is a standardized civilian employment contract signed by appellant, with an organization described as “The Landing Strip Civilian Club,” some provisions of which appear to suggest that appellant was “accompanying” the Armed Forces. Although the District Judge noted that these provisions “are not conclusive and cannot confer jurisdiction * * *,"2 he nevertheless concluded that they adequately sustained the jurisdiction of the military.
We think the issue of such prime importance that it ought not to be finally determined upon these matters alone, taken “at face value,”3 and without further proof. In the interest of justice, we think a final determination should rest, instead, upon a record which adequately discloses the actual relationship which existed between appellant and the Air Force during the relevant period.
We therefore reverse the order below insofar as it dismissed the petition for habeas corpus, and remand the cause for reconsideration by the District Court, upon additional evidence furnished by the-parties in further hearings on the issue-of whether appellant was accompanying-the Armed Forces. To expedite a final determination in this cause, our mandate-will issue forthwith.
Reversed and remanded for further hearing and reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.
. 64 Stat. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 552 (11).
. Transcript of Record, p. 166.
. Ibid.