WILLIAM BOONE DARDEN, CHIEF OF POLICE, CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH; WILLIAM WILKINS, CITY MANAGER, CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH; AND CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, PETITIONERS,
v.
POLICE AND FIRE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD, CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, CONSTITUTED BY ITS MEMBERS, JAPETH BOWMAN, JAMES ANDREWS, RUDE JACKSON, VINCENT GOODMAN, EDWARD CROWLEY, RICHARD LYLES, JAMES FITZGERALD AND LENNY COTTRELL, AS ALTERNATE, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida District Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion because an appeal from a non-final order had divested it of authority to enter final orders disposing of the cause.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order denying the motion for summary judgment because the filing of the notice of appeal on January 4, 1982, divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the cause. Consequently, the order denying summary judgment cannot stand.
[1] A notice of appeal from a non-final order divests the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the cause.
[2] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter a summary judgment while an interlocutory appeal from a prior order in the same cause is pending.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On January 4, 1982, when petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, petitioners divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the cause.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that filing a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to enter final orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioners (defendants in the trial court) sought a writ of certiorari to review the trial court's order denying their motion for summary judgment, w…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners, who were defendants in the trial court, seek a writ of certiorari directed to the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment, which they sought upon the ground that the respondent board lacked capacity to sue. The petition must be denied because of the procedural posture in which petitioners are placed. On January 4, 1982, when petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, petitioners divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the cause. Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(f)1; Carter v. Dorman, 385 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). A summary judgment concluding that the respondent board lacked capacity to sue would have illustrated such an order. Therefore, it cannot stand.2
The appendix reflects that the trial court’s order denying summary judgment was entered on January 8, 1982, four days after the filing of the appeal. At that time, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter summary judgment in favor of petitioners. For this reason alone, the order denying petitioners’ motion for summary judgment does not constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law.
DOWNEY, GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur. . Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f) provides:
Stay of Proceedings. In the absence of a stay, during the pendency of a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing; provided that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such review.
. A similar situation occurred in Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v. Zelikoff, 323 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), which was decided prior to the adoption of present Rule 9.130(f), but the principle recited therein is still applicable. While an interlocutory appeal was pending upon the severance of the third party complaint, the trial court entered summary judgment upon the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff against the initial defendant. The District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment, without prejudice to the renewal of the motion, when all parties were properly before the court.
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Sammons v. Sammons, 479 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…t while the non-final appeal was pending in this [*225] court.2 Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(f) (“the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such [non-final appellate] review.”); Darden v. Police & Fire Civil Service Board, 423 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Carter v. Dorman, 385 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). 2. On the merits, the Colorado decree was not entitled to full faith and credit and its consequent enforcement because it constituted an in rem judgment, directly affecting t…
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Connor Realty, Inc. v. Ocean Terrace N. Condo. Ass'n, 572 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…720 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); A.B.T. Corp., Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 533 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Hirschorn v. Superior Realty of Florida, 450 So. 2d 510 (Fla. DCA 1984); Darden v. Police and Fire Civ. Service Bd., City of Riviera Beach, 423 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Esposito v. Horning, 416 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The final judgment and subsequent orders were entered without jurisdiction and they are a nullity. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgments and subsequent orders and…
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Brent C. Miller, Charles M. Rand, & Miller & Rand, P.A. v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 639 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…cy of any remedy at law, and the substantial likelihood of success on the merits which, in turn, involve questions regarding the validity and enforceability of the provisions of the parties’ contract. See Darden v. Police & Fire Civil Service Board, 423 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). See also Shadow Lakes Woods, Inc. v. Schneider, 414 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Compare Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932), Employee Benefit Plans, Inc. v. Radice Corporate Center I, Inc., 593…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carter v. Dorman, 385 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v. Murray Zelikoff & Clarwood Builders, Inc., 323 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)