RONALD ELTON CUNNINGHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellant Ronald Cunningham was convicted of drug trafficking and denied bail pending appeal under Florida Statute § 903.133, which prohibits bail for persons convicted of first-degree drug trafficking felonies. The court reversed, holding that applying § 903.133 to Cunningham violated the ex post facto prohibition because he committed the offense before the statute's effective date.
The court held that § 903.133 was ex post facto as applied to Cunningham because he committed the offense prior to the statute's effective date. Although release on bail pending appeal is not a constitutional right, a statute that retroactively alters penal provisions in a more onerous manner violates the ex post facto prohibition, and the significant event for ex post facto analysis is the date of the offense, not the date of conviction.
[1] A statute that is retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense violates the ex post facto prohibition, even if it does not impair an a…
[2] The significant event for determining the ex post facto effect of a statute denying bail pending appeal is the date of the offense, not the date of conviction.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A law need not impair an affirmative, enforceable right to violate the ex post facto prohibition.”
Establishes that ex post facto violations extend beyond constitutional rights to retroactive alterations of statutory penal provisions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCunningham was convicted of drug trafficking, a first-degree felony, on December 10, 1981. He committed the offense on March 13, 1980. The trial court…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Bail Pending Appeal cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was adjudged guilty of drug trafficking, a first degree felony in violation of section 893.135, Florida Statutes (1979). Appellant filed a motion for bail pending appeal.
The trial court denied the motion stating that “section 903.133, Florida Statutes prohibits this Court from granting bail to said Defendant since he has been adjudged guilty of first degree felony for violation of section 893.135, Florida Statutes.” Section 903.133 states that “no person adjudged guilty of a first degree felony for a violation of s. 893.13 or s. 893.135 shall be admitted to bail pending appellate review.” Appellant contends that the application of this statute in his case violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws because the commission of the offense took place before the effective date of section 903.133.
We agree.
Release on bail pending appeal is not an absolute right guaranteed by the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. Kelly v. State, 362 So. 2d 945 (Fla.1978); Hart v. State, 405 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) reh’g. denied, 415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla.1982).
However, a law need not impair an affirmative, enforceable right to violate the ex post facto prohibition. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). A statute that merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature violates the ex post facto prohibition if it is both retrospective and is more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense. Weaver. In Greene v. State, 238 So. 2d 296 (Fla.1970), the appellant was denied bail pending appeal.
The trial court relied upon section 903.132, Florida Statutes which denies bail pending appeal to any person who “has previously been convicted of a felony, the commission of which occurred prior to the commission of the subsequent felony....” The Florida Supreme Court in Greene held that although section 903.132 depends upon conviction of the second or subsequent of fense, the significant event as far as judging ex post facto effect is the date of the offense rather than the conviction. Likewise, although section 903.133, which denies bail pending appeal of a conviction of drug trafficking, depends upon conviction of the offense, the significant event as far as judging ex post facto effect is the date of the offense and not the date of conviction.
In the instant case, appellant committed the offense on March 13, 1980. He was adjudged guilty on December 10, 1981. The effective date of section 903.133 was June 6, 1980. Thus, appellant committed the offense prior to the effective date of the statute. Therefore, as to appellant, section 903.133 was ex post facto in effect and should not have been relied upon in denying release on bail pending appeal.
We reverse the court’s order denying appellant bail pending appeal and remand for proceedings consistent with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e). See also Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla.1956).
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hayes v. State, 448 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…uld not be disadvantageous to the defendant and, therefore, would not be an illegal ex post facto application. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla.1981); Cunningham v. State, 423 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Such an application would carry out the legislative intent of the statutory revision reducing the length of time for which a trial court can retain jurisdiction. Accordingly, the conviction is AFFIRMED, but the case is REMANDED…
-
Ivey v. State, 453 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…effective date of the statute, but who was sentenced after the effective date, would not be disadvantageous to the defendant and, thus, would not be an ex post facto application. See State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla.1981); Cunningham v. State, 423 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Therefore, since appellant was sentenced after the effective date of the statute, the court under Hayes was limited to retaining jurisdiction only over one-third of his sentence. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction, b…
-
United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1985)…, 238 So. 2d 296, 300-01 (Fla.1970) (application of bail statute to deny bail pending appeal from conviction on second felony violated ex post facto clauses where bail statute became effective after commission of second felony); Cunningham v. State, 423 So. 2d 580 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (per curiam) (ex post facto clause prohibited application of statute denying bail pending appeal of drug trafficking conviction to defendant who committed offense before effective date of statute); cf. Parker v. State, 667 P.…
Authorities Cited
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981)
- Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956)
- Greene v. State, 238 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1970)
- Hart v. State, 405 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Kelly v. State, 362 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1978)