LEON SHAFFER GOLNICK ADVERTISING, INC., D/B/A THE GOLNICK COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JERRY CEDAR, APPELLEE
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The court held that filing an answer, affirmative defenses, and a motion to dismiss prior to a default hearing deprives the court of authority to enter a default, even if a notice of appearance was filed earlier.
[1] Filing an answer, affirmative defenses, or a motion to dismiss prior to a hearing on a motion for default deprives the trial court of the authority to enter a default.
[2] A notice of appearance alone, filed solely to gain additional time to plead, is an improper use of court rules.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn employer's attorney filed only a notice of appearance within the time to plead, leading the employee to move for default. The employer then filed a…
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment, which we reverse and remand. In doing so, we wish to comment upon the misunderstanding and misuse of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; the necessity for consideration of amendments thereto because of what we believe to be other than isolated misuse; and a practice we would like to see terminated.
Appellee, who formerly was employed by appellant, brought this action against it to collect commissions, and to be reimbursed for expenses and compensated for vacation time. The employer’s attorney filed only a “Notice of Appearance” within twenty days of service of process on his client. Appellee moved for default, and hearing was set on the motion. A week prior to the hearing, appellant’s attorney filed an answer, affirmative defenses and a motion to dismiss. Appellant’s attorney did not appear at the hearing on the motion; and the trial court noted this non-appearance in the default judgment which it entered and refused to vacate. At the hearing on the motion to vacate, both attorneys made unsworn representations about the non-appearance of appellant’s attorney at the hearing on appel-lee’s motion for default. Final judgment was entered, and rehearing denied.
First, the misunderstanding was that of the trial court as to the effect of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b) and (c).1 When appellant filed its answer, affirmative defenses and motion to dismiss— days prior to the hearing on the motion for default — it deprived the trial court of the authority to consider whether a default should be entered or to enter one.2 The hearing on the motion was superfluous; and the attorney’s non-appearance was legally justified, albeit rude if he was noticed and failed to contact the court.
Second, the misuse was that of appellant’s attorney by filing a notice of appearance admittedly because he knew the clerk could not enter a default with the notice in the court file, and doing so for the purpose of getting additional time in which to plead. We believe this practice is used often by others, and we condemn it.3
Third, the amendment we urge is with respect to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(a),4 (b) and (c) wherein the word “paper” is being used by attorneys as their justification for filing notices of appearance — nothing more — to gain time for the filing of pleadings. We urge the elimination of such word and its substitution with the words “motion or responsive pleading.”
Fourth, the practice we wish to see terminated is that of attorneys making un sworn statements of fact at hearings which trial courts may consider as establishing facts. It is essential that attorneys conduct themselves as officers of the court; but their unsworn statements do not establish facts in the absence of stipulation. Trial judges cannot rely upon these unsworn statements as the basis for making factual determinations; and this court cannot so consider them on review of the record. If the advocate wishes to establish a fact, he must provide sworn testimony through witnesses other than himself or a stipulation to which his opponent agrees.
DOWNEY and BERANEK, JJ., concur. .Subsections (b) and (c) of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500, which deals with defaults and final judgments thereon, provide:
(b) By the Court. When a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules or any applicable statute or any order of court, the court may enter a default against such party; provided that if such party has filed or served any paper in the action, he shall be served with notice of the application for default.
(c) Right to Plead. A party may plead or otherwise defend at any time before default is entered. If a party in default attempts to file any paper after a default is entered except under subdivision (d), the clerk shall return the paper to the party and notify him of the entry of the default. The clerk shall make an entry on the progress docket of the action taken.
. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson, 341 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); and Board of Regents v. Hardin, 393 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
. See Miami Steel Traders, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(a) provides for defaults:
By the Clerk. When a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to file or serve any paper in the action, the party seeking relief may have the clerk enter a default against the party failing to serve or file such paper.
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Westinghouse Elevator Co. v. DFS Constr. Co. & Fed. Ins. Co., 438 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…. Additionally, the trial judge could not rely on the factual representations made by the attorneys during the course of the argument of the motion, and this court also cannot consider them on review. Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Since the appellees were relying on a factual defense, the trial court erred in granting the motion to set aside the default judgment because the appellees did not set forth the ultimate facts to support that defense in a verif…
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Procter & Gamble Co. v. Swilley, 462 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…o. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, supra; Cavalere v. Graham, supra. See generally Westinghouse Elevator Co. v. DFS Construction Co., 438 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). It also has been indicated that the showing of need encompasses a showing of diligence by the party seeking discovery of another party’s work product. See Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Maze, 318 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975…
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Blimpie Cap. Venture, Inc. v. Palms Plaza P'rs, Ltd., 636 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…1). A trial court, as well as this court, is also precluded from considering as fact unproven statements documented only by an attorney. Schneider v. Currey, 584 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). See also Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (“If the advocate wishes to establish a fact, he must provide sworn testimony through witnesses other than himself or a stipulation to which his opponent agrees.”)3 We would observe, however, that Blimpie is not without a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Daisey Q. Bryson and Salvatore DeLuca, 341 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Bd. OF Regents v. Schuyler Hardin & Transamerica Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- State v. Murray, 401 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Miami Steel Traders, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)