DAVID L. DODGE, ET UX, APPELLANTS,
v.
FIDELITY & CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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An injured subcontractor's employee sued a general contractor and its liability insurers after being allegedly injured by another employee's negligence. The court affirmed summary judgment for the insurers, holding that the general liability policy's cross-employee exception clause applies to statutory employees under workers' compensation law, thereby excluding coverage for the employee's injuries.
The cross-employee exception clause applies to statutory employees as well as actual employees. The term employee in the policy should be construed to include statutory employees as that term is used in workers' compensation law, thereby excluding coverage for the subcontractor's employee's injuries.
[1] A general liability insurance policy's "cross-employee exception clause" excludes from coverage liability arising from an insured employee's injury to a "statutory employ…
[2] The purpose of a "cross-employee exception clause" in a general liability policy is to prevent double coverage when workers' compensation law also applies.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under Florida's workers' compensation law, appellant was not only an actual employee of the subcontractor but also a "statutory employee" of the general contractor.”
Establishes appellant's dual employment status, which is critical to the analysis
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid Dodge, an employee of a subcontractor, was allegedly injured on a construction job by the negligence of Chester Park, an employee of the general…
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COWART, Judge.
Appellant, a subcontractor’s employee allegedly injured on a construction job by the negligence of Chester Park, an employee of the general contractor, sued Park and the general contractor’s general liability insurers, the appellee insurance companies. From a summary judgment in favor of the insurers, the injured employee appeals. We affirm.
Under Florida’s workers’ compensation law, appellant was not only an actual employee of the subcontractor but also a “statutory employee” of the general contractor. See Lingold v. Trans-America Insurance Company, 416 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
The general contractor carried general liability insurance for protection from potential liability to third parties injured by the general contractor’s employees. The general question here is whether the appel-lee insurers are liable on those policies for the subcontractor’s employee’s injuries. Such policies generally, and in this case, contain two common provisions to exclude coverage as to matters covered by workers’ compensation. The first, an employee exclusion clause, would exclude the general contractor’s own actual employee (such as Chester Park) from recovering from the general contractor by virtue of such employee being an insured under the policy.1 However, this exclusion relates only to injuries caused by the insured to his own employees 2 and does not exclude injuries caused by an insured employee to a fellow employee. Therefore, this latter situation is covered by a “cross-employee exception clause” which excludes from the definition of insured any person who, while engaged in the business of his employer, injures a fellow employee. The final question in this case is whether the cross-employee exception clause applies only to “actual” fellow employees or whether it also applies to “statutory” employees, such as appellant.
The purpose of the exception clause is to eliminate the double coverage that would otherwise result when workers’ compensation also applies and, under the circumstances in this case, the general contractor is required to provide workers’ compensation to appellant as a “statutory employee.” Therefore, the term employee in the policy should be construed to include “statutory employees,” as that term is used in the workers’ compensation law. This is a reasonable, logical construction of the policy in this situation, is the construction given in other jurisdictions,3 and was the one made by the trial court, whose conclusion we
AFFIRM.
ORFINGER, C.J., and SHARP, J., concur. . See, e.g., McRae v. Snelling, 303 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
. See, e.g., Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schuitema, 183 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. discharged, 193 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1967) (referring to and adopting opinion of district court).
. See, e.g., Ward v. Curry, 341 S.W. 2d 830 (Mo.1960). See generally, annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 288 (1972) (construction and application of provision of automobile liability policy expressly excluding from coverage liability arising from actions between fellow employees).
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Jefferson Ins. Co. OF NEW York v. SEA World OF Fla., Inc., 586 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…s not apply to liability assumed by the Insured under an incidental contract. Florida courts have recognized that such provisions exclude coverage for matters generally covered by workers’ compensation. Dodge v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 424 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), rev. den., 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1983).…
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Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Zenobia Revoredo, 698 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…purposes of an action for statutory benefits or damages at law or in admiralty.” [e.s.] Statutory employees have been treated identically to actual employees in relation to standard employee exclusion clauses. Dodge v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 424 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 5th DCA)(citing Ward v. Curry, 341 S.W. 2d 830 (Mo.1960), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1983)); see also Michaels v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 129 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). The logic in the exclusion from coverage of both typ…
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Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 504 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…[*417] PER CURIAM. Affirmed. §§ 440.10, .11, Fla.Stat. (1985); see Dodge v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 424 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), review denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1983).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schuitema, 183 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)
- McRAE v. Snelling, 303 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Lingold v. Transamerica Ins. Co. & Robert E. Howard, 416 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schuitema, 193 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1967)
- THE Florida BAR v. Cohen, 193 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1967)