SAMUEL M. PUDER, APPELLANT,
v.
RAYMOND INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS, INC., APPELLEE
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Puder, an architect, appealed from orders awarding attorney's fees and costs to Raymond International, a subcontractor, after Puder voluntarily dismissed his third-party indemnity and contribution claims against Raymond. The court affirmed, holding that Puder's claims against Raymond lacked any justiciable issue of law or fact and were brought solely for tactical purposes.
The court affirmed the award of attorney's fees and costs, holding that Puder had no justiciable issue of law or fact against Raymond because: (1) Raymond had no liability for contribution since it had settled via mechanics' lien action without bad faith; (2) the legal relationship between the parties did not support indemnity and there was no evidence of Raymond's negligence; (3) Puder presented no evidence of Raymond's negligence or bad faith before dismissing; and (4) Raymond was brought into the lawsuit solely for tactical purposes.
[1] A party is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, when there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact raised in…
[2] A claim for contribution is invalid if the party from whom contribution is sought has already settled its obligations and there is no evidence of bad faith in connection…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Our review of the record leads us to agree with the trial court's finding that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact raised with regard to Puder's claims against Raymond, thus entitling Raymond to attorney's fees under section 57.105.”
States the primary holding that Puder's claims against Raymond entirely lacked legal or factual merit, supporting the attorney's fees award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePuder filed suit to recover payment for architectural services on the Flagler Center Building. The building owner counterclaimed for breach of contrac…
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HENDRY, Judge.
Appellant Samuel Puder, plaintiff/counter-defendant/third party plaintiff below, appeals from orders awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Raymond International (Raymond). We affirm.
The instant appeal arises out of a suit filed by Puder to recover payment for architectural services rendered in connection with construction of the Flagler Center Building. The building owner counterclaimed for breach of contract and negligence for design and construction defects and Puder filed a second amended third party complaint seeking indemnity and contribution from Raymond, a subcontractor on the project. Raymond’s motions for summary judgment were denied, and the cause proceeded to trial. Following presentation of all the evidence, Puder voluntarily dismissed his third party action against Raymond. The court below then granted Raymond’s motions for costs, and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1979). Appeals from the orders were consolidated by this court.1
Our review of the record leads us to agree with the trial court’s finding that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact raised with regard to Puder’s claims against Raymond, thus entitling Raymond to attorney’s fees under section 57.105. The basis for our holding is that (1) Puder had no valid claim for contribution from Raymond since Raymond had previously settled its obligations via a mechanics’ lien action and there was no evidence of bad faith in connection with the settlement, Metropolitan Dade County Transit Authority v. Simmons, 375 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 639 (Fla.1980); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); (2) the legal relationship between Puder and Raymond would not support an indemnity claim and, in addition, there was no evidence that Raymond, the potential indemnitor, was negligent, Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1979); General Portland Land Development Co. v. Stevens, 395 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Walter Taft Bradshaw & Associates v. Bedsole, 374 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); see generally Krestow v. Wooster, 360 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); (3) Puder ultimately dismissed all claims against Raymond after failing to present any evidence of Raymond’s negligence or bad faith in connection with the settlement, see MacBain v. Bowling, 374 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); (4) the attempt to create a controversy was frivolous as Raymond was brought into the lawsuit solely for tactical purposes, see Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1982); T.I.E. Communications, Inc. v. Toyota Motors Center, Inc., 391 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); and (5) the trial court’s denial of Raymond’s motion for summary judgment is insufficient to demonstrate a justiciable issue of law or fact, see White v. Montebello Corp., 397 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); City of Deerfield Beach v. Oliver-Hoffman Corporation of Deerfield Beach, 396 So. 2d 1187, 1188 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for review denied, 407 So. 2d 1104 (Fla.1981).
Affirmed.
. A second consolidated appeal was taken by Puder from subsequent orders entering final judgment for other third party defendants, taxing their costs against him, and denying his motion to tax costs against Flagler Center. See Puder v. Revitz, 424 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Stevenson v. Rutherford, 440 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…esent case sufficiently resembles Greenberg to demand a similar result. Appellees argue in part that appellants’ dismissal of their action should be a factor in support of award of attorney’s fees. They cite Puder v. Raymond International Builders, 424 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). However, as this court pointed out in Angora Enterprises v. Condominium Association of Lakeside Village, Inc., 432 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) appellant’s dismissal of their claim against appellees is not significant to the is…
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Tiedeman v. City OF Miami, 529 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…suit or could have otherwise succeeded on the merits, Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1982); New England Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Robertson, 506 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Puder v. Raymond Int’l Builders, Inc., 424 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 434 So. 2d 888 (Fla.1983); (b) attorney’s fees were properly awardable under the above statute for, among other things, litigating the amount of fee to be awarded, cf. Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F. 2d 635, 637-38 (5…
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Puder v. Revitz, 424 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…erclaim-ants, Revitz and Flagler. Section 57.041, Florida Statutes (1979). Accordingly, we decline to disturb the trial court’s orders and affirm the judgments below in their entirety. Affirmed. . See Puder v. Raymond International Builders, Inc., 424 So. 2d 78 (Fla.3d DCA 1982) for additional background on this case. . Puder did not appeal the final judgment entered in Nutting’s favor on the third party claim.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982)
- Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979)
- T.I.E. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Toyota Motors Ctr., Inc., 391 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Kessler v. Medow, 374 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Gen. Portland Land Dev. Co. & Greater Fla. Inv. v. Stevens, 395 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- City OF Deerfield Beach v. Oliver-Hoffman Corp. of Deerfield Beach, 396 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Oceanus McCALL v. State, 374 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Puder v. Revitz, 424 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- White v. The Montebello Corp., 397 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)