CORNELIUS G. ABEN, APPELLANT,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE

such evidence standing alone cannot establish the indispensable actual or constructive notice of the existence of the specific obstruction, its duration, or its dangerous character.3 Moreover, the weather reports placed in the record here tend to contradict the inference of constructive notice to the District sought to be derived therefrom. After the snowfall of February 7, the report shows that only one inch of unmelted snow or ice remained on the ground at 7:30 that evening, that only a trace remained on the evening of the following day, and that only traces of precipitation occurred on the 8th and 9th. The report specifically states that “by the 9th main highways were reported to be free of ice.”

Nothing to the contrary of our holding here was decided in Smith v. District of Columbia, 1951, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 189 F. 2d 671, 39 A.L.R.2d 773, and Lyons v. District of Columbia, 1954, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 214 F. 2d 203. In the Smith case the evidence of constructive notice was ample; the obstructions were shown to have been in existence for some ten days and were at the curb of a crosswalk in a heavily-traveled intersection. The Lyons case involved the same weather conditions as prevailed in the Smith case, and there was independent evidence in the record before us that the dangerous condition complained of had been in existence for about a week prior to the accident.

Affirmed.

. Wadlund v. City of Hartford, 1952, 139 Conn. 169, 91 A. 2d 10, and cases collected in Note, 34 A.L.R.2d 1249 (1954).

. De Boulet v. City of New York, 1st Dept., 1920, 192 App.Div. 359, 182 N.Y.S. 697, 700; Richman v. City of New York, Sup., App.T., 1st Dept., 1945, 54 N.Y.S.2d 148.

. Ward v. City of Pittsburgh, 1945, 353 Pa. 156, 44 A. 2d 553, 556; 19 McQnillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) 426-7 and § 54.114, passim; Note, 39 A.L.R.2d 782, 805 et seq.