CITY OF FT. LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF LOCAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, APPELLEE
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The City of Fort Lauderdale appealed a Department of Veteran and Community Affairs determination that its proposed 1,000-foot runway extension at the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport did not possess vested rights status under Florida law. The court affirmed the Department's decision, holding that the City's pre-1973 actions—including resolutions, rezoning, and land purchase—did not constitute sufficient authorization to commence development for vesting purposes.
The court held that the City did not obtain vested rights status for the runway extension because its pre-1973 actions did not constitute authorization to commence development. While FAA approval is not the exclusive method for obtaining vested rights, the City's resolutions, rezoning, and land purchase do not individually or collectively satisfy the authorization requirement.
[1] A municipality's purchase of land for a runway's clear zone does not, by itself, establish vested rights for a future runway extension.
[2] Resolutions that are advisory in effect and lack legally binding status do not constitute authorization to commence development for vested rights purposes.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“FAA approval is not the only way by which a runway extension may obtain vested rights status. Viewed in the factual context of this case, however, FAA approval would have been an appropriate authorization, and there may have been others about which we will not speculate.”
Establishes that while FAA approval is not the sole method for obtaining vested rights, it would have been appropriate, and the court leaves open the possibility of other methods.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Fort Lauderdale proposed a 1,000-foot western extension of an existing 6,000-foot east-west runway at the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airpor…
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PER CURIAM.
By this appeal the City of Ft. Lauderdale contends that the Department of Veteran and Community Affairs, Division of Local Resource Management (Division) erred in its binding letter of interpretation by determining that the City’s proposed 1,000 foot western extension of an existing 6,000 foot east-west runway at the Ft. Lauderdale Executive Airport does not possess vested rights status. See § 380.06(18), Fla.Stat. We disagree and affirm.
Specifically, the City argues that various actions on its part constitute “authorization to commence development” under the terms of section 380.06(18). Second, it argues that the Division may not look to FAA approval of the airport extension as constituting the only requisite authorization to commence development. Addressing the latter argument first, we agree that FAA approval is not the only way by which a runway extension may obtain vested rights status. Viewed in the factual context of this case, however, FAA approval would have been an appropriate authorization, and there may have been others about which we will not speculate.
As to the former argument, we find nothing in the City’s various actions prior to July 1, 1973, (the effective date by which vested rights status must have accrued) that amounts to an “authorization to commence development.” The resolutions of 1967 and 1969 do not constitute approval to do anything and are merely advisory in effect with no legally binding status. Second, the mere act of rezoning does not constitute such an authorization, as it has long been held that property owners do not have a vested right in zoning ordinances. City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So. 2d 428 (Fla.1954); Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Third, the City’s purchase of the land itself does not vest any rights in the runway extension, for the record affirmatively establishes that the City’s purpose in purchasing this property was to provide additional “clear zone” for the then existing runway. The mere fact that the City may have envisioned a different use for the land at some future date, without more, cannot endow that later development with vested rights status. There being no concrete evidence of any authorization to commence development by July 1, 1973, we find that the City has not demonstrated its entitlement to vested rights status for the runway extension.
We have considered the City’s contentions that the Division’s order constitutes an invalid rule under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and denies to the City equal protection under the law and find them to be without merit.
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and McCORD and MILLS, JJ., concur.
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- The City OF Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins AVE., Inc., 77 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1954)
- Town OF Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)