CHRISTOPHER M. SECKINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that while the trial court erred in preventing the defense from arguing that an accidental touching is not battery, this error was harmless.
The defendant was convicted of battery. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that an accidental touching is not battery and also prevented the…
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ORFINGER, Chief Judge.
In instructing the jury on the definition of battery, the trial court gave the standard jury instruction which defines battery as the intentional touching or striking of the victim by the defendant against the victim’s will. The court rejected appellant’s request that the instruction also advise the jury that an accidental or unintentional touching does not constitute battery.
We cannot hold the trial court in error for refusing to give the converse of the legal definition of battery. Refusal to give charges which are covered by charges given is not ground for reversal where the error is harmless, Jarrell v. State, 135 Fla. 736, 185 So. 873 (1939), and the court properly advised the jury, many times, that they must find an intentional touching to find appellant guilty of battery. However, the trial court was in error when it ruled, in response to appellant’s request, that appellant could not argue to the jury that an accidental or unintentional touching did not constitute battery. Even though it is not the prerogative of an attorney in his closing arguments to instruct the jury on the law, it is entirely appropriate for an attorney to relate the applicable law to the facts of the case. In the instant case, counsel had every right to point out to the jury in his closing arguments that an accidental touching was not the same as an intentional one. One of the purposes of closing arguments is to give the attorneys the opportunity to tie together for the jury the law and the facts so that the jury can give the proper legal weight to the evidence in reaching its verdict. See, Taylor v. State, 330 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
However, even though the trial court erred, we find the error to be harmless, because counsel did, in fact, argue to the jury that the touching by appellant was an accident and was not intentional. § 59.041, Fla.Stat. (1981).
The judgment of conviction is
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.
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Lenon Lee McARTHUR, Jr. v. State, 801 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ee Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1999);1 Hill v. State, 515 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla.1987) (“The purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the issues by applying the evidence to the law applicable to the case.”); Seckington v. State, 424 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (“One of the purposes of closing arguments is to give the attorneys the opportunity to tie together for the jury the law and the facts .... ”); see also Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA [*1040] 1998). The c…
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Thomason v. Irmalenna Gordon, 782 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ons before closing arguments is to allow the attorneys to be aware of the law so that they will be able to properly relate the law to the facts in their argument.” Taylor v. State, 330 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). See also Seckington v. State, 424 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (“One of the purposes of closing arguments is to give the attorneys the opportunity to tie together for the jury the law and the facts.... ”); King v. State, 642 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (defendant was deprived of fair…
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Felton White v. State, 539 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…ion was conscious and substantial and not merely involuntary or superficial. Jones v. State, 325 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.1976). The state’s harmless error argument cannot be sustained. Seckington v. State, 424 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA), dismissed, 430 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1983), relied upon by the state, is readily distinguishable. In Seckington the court held that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction that an accidental or unintentional touching did not const…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jarrell v. State, 135 Fla. 736 (Fla. 1939)
- Taylor v. State, 330 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)