SEAMCO LABORATORIES, INC., AND FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM S. PEARSON, APPELLEE
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This workers' compensation appeal addresses whether the statute of limitations is tolled by an authorized physician providing medical treatment to an injured worker, even if the employer/carrier is not immediately notified and billed for that treatment. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the deputy commissioner's finding that treatment rendered within the statutory period tolls the statute, regardless of whether documentation was promptly submitted.
The statute of limitations is tolled by the rendering of remedial treatment by an authorized physician within the limitations period, regardless of whether the employer/carrier receives notice or a bill for such treatment. The timely provision of treatment itself—not the documentation or reporting of treatment—constitutes the tolling event.
[1] The statute of limitations for workmen's compensation claims is tolled by the rendering of remedial treatment by an authorized physician.
[2] The furnishing of remedial treatment by an employer's authorized physician within the statutory period is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, regardless of whe…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is the remedial treatment that tolls the statute, not the report of the treatment.”
Establishes that the act of providing treatment, not documentation or billing, constitutes the tolling event under Florida workers' compensation law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant sustained a compensable work injury on December 22, 1978, and was initially treated by Dr. Molloy, the authorized treating physician. Employe…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Employer/Carrier appeal workmen’s compensation order finding statute of limitations has been tolled by the rendering of medical care to claimant by authorized physician.
The employer/carrier ask us to reverse the deputy commissioner because the employer/carrier were not notified that this medical care was being furnished or were not requested to pay for it within a two-year limitation period. We find the deputy did not err and affirm.
Claimant sustained a compensable injury on December 22, 1978, and was treated by Richard P. Molloy, M.D. The employer/carrier terminated compensation benefits on January 15, 1979, when claimant reached maximum medical improvement. Subsequently, however, claimant’s respiratory condition resulting from the injury worsened. On July 7,1980, claimant returned to Dr. Molloy, his authorized treating physician, who hospitalized him. Employer/Carrier admit in their brief that Dr. Molloy did not lose his status as claimant’s authorized treating physician.
Although claimant requested that Dr. Molloy send his medical bills and reports to the employer/carrier, Dr. Molloy failed to do so within the two-year period following the termination of compensation benefits on January 15, 1979.
On August 10, 1981, claimant filed a claim for further compensation benefits. The deputy commissioner rejected the employer/carrier defense that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations and found that the statute of limitations had been tolled by the rendering of treatment by the authorized physician.
Appellants correctly point out the two pertinent statutes: section 440.19(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1977) and section 440.13(3)(d), Fla.Stat. (1978 Supp.).
Section 440.19(l)(a) reads:
The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedial treatment has been furnished by the employer without an award on account of such injury a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer. Section 440.13(3)(d) reads in part:
All rights for remedial attention under this section shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or remedial attention has been furnished by the employer without an award on account of such injury a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or within 2 years after the date of the last remedial attention furnished by the employer; ...
The case here is similar to the case of Vincent v. Tropicana Products, IRC Order 2-3103, cert. den., 351 So. 2d 409 (Fla.1977). There it was held that treatment by an authorized physician within the two-year period was sufficient to toll the running of the statute and the employee was not obligated to first obtain further authorization for the treatment. Vincent held that a discharge by the treating doctor does not eliminate or shorten the two-year protective period. The deputy commissioner in the case sub judice correctly noted that even though Dr. Molloy did not submit a bill or a report to the employer/carrier within the two-year period, as the Vincent physician did, he rendered remedial treatment before the expiration of the two-year period. It is the remedial treatment that tolls the statute, not the report of the treatment.
In Johnson v. Division of Forestry, 397 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), we held:
The statutory language is clear that it is the last furnishing of such remedial treatment or payment of compensation from which the two-year limitation is measured.
The claim was timely filed within two years from the furnishing of remedial treatment by an authorized physician.
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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McNEILLY v. Farm Stores, Inc., 553 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…to revive the limitations period as of the latter date. We disagree. An employee is not obligated to obtain further authorization for treatment by an authorized physician within the two year limitations period. Seamco Laboratories, Inc. v. Pearson, 424 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), citing Vincent v. Tropicana Products, IRC Order 2-3103 cert. den. 351 So. 2d 409 (Fla.1977). But see Gonzalez v. Allure Shoe Corp., 160 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1964). Here, Dr. Cather was McNeilly’s authorized physician at the time of t…
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SOL Dale Bldgs., Inc. v. Schweickert, 656 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…in order to toll the statute. We find, as did the judge of compensation claims, that this case is controlled by this court’s decisions in McNeilly v. Farm Stores, Inc., 553 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), and Seamco Laboratories, Inc. v. Pearson, 424 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In Seamco, we held that treatment by an authorized physician within the two-year period was sufficient to toll the running of the statute even though the doctor did not submit a bill or a report to the E/C within the two-year pe…
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Escribano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. & Gates McDonald (Servicing Agent), 453 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…r 1979. The deputy commissioner also erred in stating that notice was required to the employer that the medical treatment of March 12, 1981, was in regard to the injury of November 1979. As this court stated in Seamco Laboratories, Inc. v. Pearson, 424 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), “It is the remedial treatment that tolls the statute, not the report of the treatment.” REVERSED and REMANDED. MILLS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.…
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- Johnson v. Division OF Forestry, 397 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)