RAUL FINLAY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Finlay appeals his convictions for carrying a concealed firearm, armed burglary, and armed robbery, receiving two consecutive life sentences plus five years. The court reversed because the trial court improperly joined offenses from two separate incidents occurring eight days apart, and admitted prejudicial evidence of a false name.
The court reversed the convictions, holding that the offenses from August 10 and August 18 were unrelated and improperly joined, requiring severance. The court also found error in admitting testimony about the false name, which was irrelevant to the August 18 offenses and constituted consciousness of guilt regarding the August 10 offenses without proper jury instruction.
[1] A defendant has a right to a severance of charges if offenses are improperly charged in a single indictment or information.
[2] A court shall grant a severance of related offenses joined in a single indictment or information if appropriate to promote a fair determination of guilt or innocence of e…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In case two or more charges of related offenses are joined in a single indictment or information, the court nevertheless shall grant a severance of charges on motion of the State or of a defendant.”
Establishes the mandatory severance requirement under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(a)(2)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn August 10, 1981, Finlay committed an armed robbery and burglary at Vento's home, stealing a car. On August 18, 1981, eight days later, police obser…
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BASKIN, Judge.
Defendant Finlay appeals his convictions for carrying a concealed firearm, armed burglary, and armed robbery. He received two consecutive life sentences followed by five years’ imprisonment. He contends that the court erred in denying his motion to sever the offenses which were neither facets of a single transaction nor connected acts. We agree and reverse.
The charges against Finlay were the result of two incidents occurring eight days apart. On August 18, 1981, Finlay was arrested following a chase by police, who observed him commit a traffic violation. At the time, Finlay was driving the car stolen during an armed robbery of Rodobal-do Vento and an armed burglary at Vento’s home on August 10, 1981. Miami City Commissioner J.L. Plummer informed the police that he had seen two men walking after they had abandoned a car. Commissioner Plummer followed Finlay in his car, saw Finlay drop the gun alleged to have been used on August 10, and aimed his own gun at Finlay, assisting in his apprehension by police. Finlay was acquitted of the charge of aggravated assault on Commissioner Plummer. The concealed firearm charge related to the August 18 incident.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(a) states:
(a) Severance of offenses.
(1) In case two or more offenses are improperly charged in a single indictment or information, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the charges upon timely motion thereof.
(2) In case two or more charges of related offenses are joined in a single indictment or information, the court nevertheless shall grant a severance of charges on motion of the State or of a defendant.
(i) before trial upon showing that such severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense, or,
(ii) during trial, only with defendant’s consent, upon a showing that such severance is necessary to achieve a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.
In our view, the offenses committed on August 10, 1981, are unrelated to those committed on August 18, 1981. We find no merit in the state’s contention that the burglary led to the theft of the car and then to the commission of the traffic infraction which led to the aggravated assault with the gun used in the robbery. We discern neither a causal relationship nor a series of connected episodes, Green v. State, 408 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Rodgers v. State, 325 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dismissed, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.1977); Moore v. State, 259 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), sufficient to justify joinder. McMullen v. State, 405 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.152 committee note (1972 revision). When improper joinder has occurred, prejudice is conclusively presumed, Macklin v. State, 395 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and reversal is required. In addition, we find error in the admission of testimony that defendant Fin-lay gave a false name when arrested on August 18, 1981. If the name given were in fact false, a matter which was not established during trial, that fact had no bearing on the offenses committed on August 18, 1981, but established, if anything, only a consciousness of guilt regarding offenses committed on August 10, 1981. Brown v. State, 391 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). If the giving of a false name were admitted as an indication of flight to avoid arrest, Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), the inferences properly drawn should have been explained by a charge to the jury.
For these reasons, we reverse the convictions and remand for appropriate proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…rial of an “alias.” We disagree. Clearly, the state was entitled to present this testimony as evidence of a consciousness of guilt of the offense which had just been committed. Cf. Brown v. State, 391 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980); Finlay v. State, 424 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983). The defendant also claims that the trial court failed to make the requisite findings in connection with his sentence to an extended term under the habitual offender law, Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1981). With this conte…
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Conley v. State, 592 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…alias to avoid arrest or prosecution, testimony regarding the alias is admissible as evidence of a consciousness of guilt of the offense. Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95, 95 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 456 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1984); Finlay v. State, 424 So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). This was not the situation at bar, however. Because Conley was already under arrest when he gave the false name, it is apparent that he was not using the alias to avoid arrest or prosecution for the instant offenses, but may…
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Highsmith v. State, 580 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…gave a second false name immediately following discovery of the pistol in his car does not affect my conclusion, because that evidence alone is insufficient to clearly establish a consciousness of guilt as to the offense tried. See Finlay v. State, 424 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). As to the instruction to the jury on flight, which was based solely upon the appellant’s use of false names, the rule has long been recognized that such instructions have been sustained in cases only in which the evidence convi…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mervin Brown v. State, 391 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- MacKlin v. State, 395 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Green v. State, 408 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- McMULLEN v. State, 405 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Rodgers v. State, 325 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Moore v. State, 259 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)