PATRICK BRIAN MULLIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Patrick Brian Mullin appeals his convictions for sexual battery and kidnapping, challenging the trial court's consolidation of the separately charged offenses without advance notice and its exclusion of expert testimony regarding the effects of volatile hydrocarbon inhalation. The appellate court reversed, finding that the untimely consolidation was prejudicial error because the two crimes required different defenses and the excluded evidence was relevant to a voluntary intoxication defense.
The consolidation of the separately charged offenses without prior notice on the morning of trial constituted reversible error because the two crimes might have required different defensive strategies. The trial court also erred in excluding the expert medical testimony regarding the effects of volatile hydrocarbons on human behavior and appellant's testimony about his prior abuse of such substances, as this evidence was relevant to a voluntary intoxication defense to the specific intent crime of kidnapping.
[1] Consolidating trials of separately charged offenses without notice on the morning of trial is prejudicial and constitutes reversible error.
[2] A defense of voluntary intoxication may negate the specific intent required for kidnapping but not the general intent required for sexual battery.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“For the two crimes charged, the defenses might well have been different. The defense of voluntary intoxication by inhalation of volatile hydrocarbons, offered by appellant, would possibly negate the specific intent necessary for kidnapping but not the general intent necessary for sexual battery.”
Explains why consolidation was prejudicial—the crimes required potentially different defensive theories based on specific versus general intent
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was charged by indictment with sexual battery and by separate information with kidnapping of a ten-year-old victim in a wooded area. Police …
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RYDER, Judge.
Patrick Brian Mullin appeals from his convictions for sexual battery and kidnapping, arguing the lower court erred in excluding certain testimony and in consolidating trials on the charges. We agree that consolidation of the charges on the morning of trial was error, and we reverse.
The state charged appellant by indictment with sexual battery as proscribed by section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and by information with kidnapping as proscribed by section 787.01(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1981). On the morning of trial, the court invited and granted the state’s oral motion for consolidation of the trials of the offenses charged under the separate indictment and information. Appellant objected to the consolidation without notice as prejudicial.
The testimony at trial indicated that appellant stopped the ten-year old victim in a wooded area and committed the acts charged. Police apprehended appellant in the area a short time later and the victim positively identified him at that time. When arrested, appellant appeared “high” and had two tubes of glue in his possession — one spent and the other unopened. Appellant contended he was unable to remember any events which transpired from noon of the day in question when he left work after being overcome by naptha fumes, until he awoke in jail the next day. After deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both crimes.
In response to the state’s motion in li-mine, the trial court ruled inadmissible the testimony of appellant’s expert medical witness regarding the effects of inhalation of volatile hydrocarbons upon human behavior. The court further refused to admit testimony by appellant regarding his prior abuse of volatile intoxicants and his prior behavior after sniffing glue.
We agree with appellant’s contention on appeal that consolidation of trials of the separately charged offenses, without notice on the morning of trial, was prejudicial and constituted reversible error. See Belote v. State, 344 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1977); Kilgore v. State, 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). For the two crimes charged, the defenses might well have been different. The defense of voluntary intoxication by inhalation of volatile hydrocarbons, offered by appellant, would possibly negate the specific intent necessary for kidnapping but not the general intent necessary for sexual battery. Thus, appellant’s strategy of whether to testify concerning voluntary intoxication may well have been prejudiced by the untimely consolidation below.
Additionally, we note no support for the lower court’s exclusion of testimony regarding appellant’s condition. Appellant’s expert witness, a neurologist, was qualified to testify to the medical effects of sniffing glue and other hydrocarbons upon human behavior if he knew the effects. Appellant’s testimony of his prior abuse, if relevant to the above medical opinion, would also be admissible to establish a voluntary intoxication defense to the specific intent crime.
The convictions below are set aside and each case REMANDED for new trial.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Citator
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Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1993)…ication is a defense to felony murder when the underlying felony is a specific-intent crime. Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla.1985). Kidnapping is a specific-intent crime. Heddleson v. State, 512 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA1987); Mullin v. State, 425 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA1983); see § 787.01, Fla.Stat. (1989). Although the trial court instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication was a defense to premeditated murder, it did not so instruct the jury with regard to felony murder. Fundamental error is err…
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Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991)…cation is a defense to felony murder when the underlying felony is a specific-intent crime. Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla.1985). Kidnapping is a specific-intent crime. Heddleson v. State, 512 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Mullin v. State, 425 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see § 787.01, Fla.Stat. (1989). Although the trial court instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication was a defense to premeditated murder, it did not so instruct the jury with regard to felony murder. Fundamental error is er…
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Heddleson v. State, 512 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…t erred in denying his requested jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. We agree that such instruction should have been given, but only for the kidnapping charge. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to a specific intent crime. Mullin v. State, 425 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); and Mellins v. State, 395 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), pet. for rev. denied, 402 So. 2d 613 (Fla.1981). Kidnapping is a specific intent crime. Mullin. However, sexual battery is a general intent crime. Buford v. State, 492 So…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kilgore v. State, 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Belote v. State, 344 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1977)