RALPH ARNOLD AND SARAH ARNOLD, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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The Arnolds appealed the dismissal of their declaratory action seeking personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from their insurer. Ralph Arnold was injured when pushed out of the way of an out-of-control vehicle during a collision between two cars. The court held that PIP benefits are available even without direct physical contact between the insured and a motor vehicle, provided the injury results from a collision involving a motor vehicle.
Personal injury protection benefits are payable when injuries result from a collision involving a motor vehicle, even without direct physical contact between the insured and the vehicle. The statutory requirement of "physical contact" is satisfied if the injury results from a collision with a motor vehicle, and traditional tests of causation must be met.
[1] Personal injury protection benefits are payable to an insured not occupying a motor vehicle if the injuries were caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle, even if…
[2] The "physical contact" requirement for personal injury protection benefits is satisfied if the injury results from a collision involving a motor vehicle.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 627.736(4)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that for an insured not occupying a motor vehicle, personal injury protection benefits are payable if the injuries were caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle.”
Establishes the statutory basis for PIP benefits for pedestrians
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRalph Arnold was crossing a street with a coworker when two vehicles collided nearby. An out-of-control vehicle appeared about to hit Arnold. His comp…
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RYDER, Judge.
The Arnolds appeal dismissal of their declaratory complaint seeking personal injury protection benefits from South Carolina Insurance Company.
Appellants’ complaint below alleges that appellee insurer had issued them an automobile insurance policy. While Ralph Arnold was crossing a street with a coworker, two vehicles traveling nearby collided. One motor vehicle, out of control, appeared about to hit appellant. Appellant’s companion saw the vehicle, pushed appellant out of the vehicle’s path and jumped out of the way himself. Appellant was knocked to the pavement by his rescuer and suffered the injuries complained of. Upon application for personal injury protection benefits from appellee, appellee refused the claim. Appellants settled the liability claim directly with the insurer of the offending vehicle.
The court below dismissed appellants’ declaratory complaint, finding that the relief sought was precluded by statutes and case law pertinent to personal injury protection benefits. On appeal, appellants suggest that while Ralph Arnold was not actually hit by the vehicle, actual physical contact with a defined motor vehicle is not necessary for entitlement to personal injury protection benefits. Appellants argue that traditional causation is necessary for benefits to accrue. Since the errant vehicle caused appellant’s injury, benefits are due.
We agree that insurance benefits are due below. Section 627.736(4)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that for an insured not occupying a motor vehicle, personal injury protection benefits are payable if the injuries were caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court has stated that while actual physical contact is not necessary, traditional tests of causation must be met. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Castagna, 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1979). However, the statutory language of “physical contact” is not completely without meaning. The physical contact contemplated by the statute is satisfied if the injury results from a collision with a motor vehicle. Negron v. Travelers Insurance Co., 282 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
That there was no actual physical contact between the pedestrian and defined motor vehicle is not determinative of coverage. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 307 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The facts alleged below show a collision involving two motor vehicles. One of those vehicles, out of control, then caused appellant’s injuries. The injuries thus resulted from a collision. Unlike Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Castagna, supra, causation is not at issue from the facts alleged below. We see no distinction between the physical contact between two vehicles below and the physical contact of a motor vehicle striking a parked vehicle in Royal Indemnity, supra. Both “physical contacts” set in motion events which “caused” injury. That is all the statute requires.
We agree with appellee that the complaint states no cause of action for personal injury protection benefits on behalf of Sarah Arnold, and we AFFIRM the dismissal as to her. The dismissal of Ralph Arnold’s complaint is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
HOBSON, A.C.J. and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
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S.C. Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 467 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…n sued appellant for recovery of PIP benefits arising from the accident. The court dismissed the complaint on the premise that appellee’s accident was not within the scope of PIP coverage. This court reversed. Arnold v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 425 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). On remand, the trial court was presented with the issue of whether to offset appellee’s workers’ compensation benefits against payments due under his PIP claim. The court declined to do so and entered a $6,209 judgment for appell…
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Niglio v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…n analysis to injuries not caused by direct contact with a motor vehicle, the unifying principle is that coverage exists when a ear is the most substantial factor in bringing about the victim’s injury. For example, Arnold v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 437 So. 2d 677 (Fla.1983), found PIP coverage where someone pushed the plaintiff to the pavement to save him from a car that was out of control as a result of a traffic accident. See Cherwin, 673 So. 2d at 113 (plai…
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Lowd v. CAL Kovens Constr. Corp. & Bradley Kovens, 546 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…erated his truck carelessly in tailgating the automobile, thereby precluding the motorcyclist and automobile driver from seeing each other and avoiding the collision. The case was remanded for a new trial. In Arnold v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 425 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 437 So. 2d 677 (1983), the plaintiff and a co-worker were crossing a street when two nearby vehicles collided. One of the vehicles appeared about to hit the plaintiff, and his coworker pushed him out of the vehicle’s…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ercole Castagna, 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979)
- Negron v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Detlof Oliver Lofstrum, 307 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Royal Indem. Co. v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 307 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)