ANNA CARNER, APPELLANT,

v.

STEPHEN CARNER, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By (16 total)

• State v. Meyers, 708 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
  …d in the habitual felony offender and habitual violent felony offender is construed as permissive, “must” and “shall” as used in the violent career criminal provision can only be construed as mandatory. See City of Miami v. Save Brickell Ave., Inc., 426 So. 2d 1100, 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Fixel v. Clevenger, 285 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). See also Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla.1993)(holding words employed in statute should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense). Furthermore,…
• City OF Sarasota v. Windom, 736 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
  …of device. The power to challenge that installation, however, rests not with the plaintiffs, but with the Department of Transportation. The plaintiffs cite Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla.1972); City of Miami v. Save Brickell Ave., Inc., 426 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); and Skaggs-Albertson’s v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.1978); in further support of their standing position. However, those cases are readily distinguishable as generally dealing with a procedural challenge, such as a…
• Perdue Farms Inc. v. Hook, 777 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
  …mplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection (l).2 (Emphasis supplied.) This is clearly a permissive provision. See Fixel v. Clevenger, 285 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); City of Miami v. Save Brickell Ave., Inc., 426 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (holding that, in statutory construction, the word “may” when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term rather than the mandatory connotation of the word “shall.”). In enacting this section, the legislature did two sign…

Authorities Cited

• Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
• Bullard v. Foster L. Bullard, 385 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)