M.E. CHARLESWORTH, LIMITED, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIO PEREZ, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
M.E. Charlesworth Limited, an insurer, appealed a directed verdict in favor of Mario Perez on the question of whether Perez complied with his insurance policy's requirement that his stolen boat be stored at a designated "marina." The court affirmed, holding that the unfenced lot with a building, stored boats, boat ramp, dock, moorings, and manager's houseboat qualified as a marina under the broadest reasonable definition required for insurance policy interpretation.
The trial court correctly determined that the term "marina" can reasonably include an unfenced lot containing a building for stored boats, boat ramp, dock, moorings, and a manager's residence, and thus Perez complied with the policy requirement. The insurer's alternative characterization of the facility was properly rejected.
[1] An insurance policy's terms should be construed broadly to provide coverage.
[2] The term "marina" in an insurance policy may reasonably include a facility with a building, stored boats, a boat ramp, dock, moorings, and a houseboat where the manager r…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court gave the term "marina" the broadest definition possible to provide coverage”
Establishes the legal standard for interpreting insurance policy terms, requiring maximum breadth to favor coverage
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePerez owned a boat that was stolen while stored at a lot that the insurer claimed did not qualify as a "marina" under the insurance policy. The lot wa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Insurance Policy Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
By stipulation of the parties, the sole disputed issue in the case was whether Perez, the insured whose boat was stolen, had complied with the requirement of the insur- anee policy that his boat be stored or kept at one of certain designated places, including a “marina.” As it was required to do, the trial court gave the term “marina” the broadest definition possible to provide coverage, DaCosta v. General Guaranty Ins. Co. of Florida, 226 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1969); Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. of Shelby v. Manchester, 376 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), and correctly determined that the term “marina” may reasonably include, as the proof showed, an apparently unfashionable, unfenced lot upon which there was a building and stored boats, and adjoining which there was a boat ramp, dock, moorings, and a houseboat wherein the manager of the facility (who collected monthly boat storage fees and ramp-user charges from Perez and others) lived.1 Because, at least when it comes to construing an insurance policy, these things do a “marina” make,2 it follows that the trial court properly directed a verdict for the insured and properly rejected the insurer’s offers of proof which, at most, would have shown that, in the view of others, the place where Perez stored his boat did not meet their definition of a marina.
Affirmed.
. Judge Schwartz’s observation in the obverse case of Puente v. Arroyo, 366 So. 2d 857, 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), that while “the term ‘cat’ may include a lion, it cannot include a dog,” does not preclude coverage where a boat is stored in a dog of a marina, which is nonetheless a marina.
. It may very well be that the insured would prevail even unaided by the rule requiring an expansive definition of terms in insurance policies relating to coverage. For example, Section 159.02(21), Florida Statutes (1981), defines marinas as “any facilities for the sale, repair, rental, storage, and servicing of boats.” See also Bunch v. Abel, 256 Md. 212, 260 A. 2d 19, 21 (1969) (marina is a dock or basin providing secure moorings for motorboats and yachts and often offering supplies, repairs and other facilities).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Davis v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…g, the same as any other contract. Carter v. Peninsular Fire Insurance Co., 411 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Even applying, as we must, the most liberal interpretation of the language possible to achieve coverage, M.E. Charlesworth, Ltd. v. Perez, 426 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), we simply cannot say that the deceased was “occupying” the wrecker when he was struck and killed. See Testone v. Allstate Insurance Co., 165 Conn. 126, 328 A. 2d 686 (1973) (wrecker operator, who was injured when a disabled car w…
-
Asnip v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 446 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…rm, “occupying,” is, in turn, defined as “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off” a vehicle. Particularly applying, as required, the most expansive definition of the expression reasonably possible to achieve coverage, M.E. Charlesworth, Ltd. v. Perez, 426 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) — in fact, without the aid of this tool of construction — it seems clear that Asnip was, at the least, “upon” the car and was therefore “occupying” it when the accident occurred. The well-reasoned decision in Nickerson v. Citizens…
-
Simmons v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. OF Philadelphia, 496 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…d “cat” may not include a lion, it must include both Calicos and Siamese. Accord Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Cassady, 481 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 4th DCA Case no. 85-1238, opinion filed, October 15, 1986); see also M.E. [*246] Charlesworth, Ltd. v. Perez, 426 So. 2d 1107, 1108 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The arteriogram which caused the loss was part of Ms. Simmons’s medical treatment and the trial court on that ground properly found that she could not recover. Affirmed. . This holding makes it unnecessary to determi…
Authorities Cited
- DaCOSTA v. Gen. Guar. Ins. Co. OF Fla., 226 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1969)
- Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby v. Manchester, 376 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Puente v. Arroyo, 366 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)