RICHARD WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Richard Williams, an escaped prisoner from Union County, Florida, was arrested in New York and transferred to Marion County for trial without Union County authorities being notified. Williams sought discharge based on a 120-day statute of limitations, but the court affirmed the trial court's denial, holding that no 'proceeding' was made possible under the statute because Union County had no notice of Williams's presence in Florida.
Williams was not entitled to discharge because no 'proceeding' was made possible under the statute when Union County authorities were not notified that Williams was in Florida, and Florida should not be denied the right to enforce its criminal laws due to another state's oversight in failing to provide notice.
[1] A prisoner's escape from custody does not trigger the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act's 120-day speedy trial provision when the detaining authority has no knowledge…
[2] The 120-day speedy trial period under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act begins upon the prisoner's arrival in the receiving state for a proceeding made possible b…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear that the New York authorities failed to give notice to Union County that Williams was being brought to Florida as required by the last sentence of Section 941.45(4)(b).”
Establishes that proper notice was not given, which is a predicate for the statutory proceeding.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams escaped from a Florida Reception and Medical Center in Union County and fled to Marion County where he committed crimes, then to New York whe…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Detainer cases and more on FLexlaw
MILLS, Judge.
Williams appeals, contending that he was entitled to a discharge pursuant to Section 941.45(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). We disagree and affirm.
While in the custody of the Reception and Medical Center in Union County, Florida, Williams escaped. His flight took him first to Marion County where he committed various crimes and then to the State of New York where he was arrested on 15 February 1977 in connection with offenses he committed while in that state.
Pursuant to Section 941.45(4), Florida Statutes (1977), Marion County filed a request for temporary custody with the State of New York. Union County also filed a detainer with the New York authorities.
In December 1977, Williams was transferred from New York to Marion County where he was tried and convicted for the offenses he committed there. Neither the New York authorities, nor Williams, nor Marion County notified the authorities in Union County that Williams was in Florida. After trial, Williams was returned to New York to serve out the remainder of his sentence there. Upon his release from incarceration in New York, Williams was sent to the Florida State Prison in April 1980, at which time Union County resumed proceedings against him on the escape charge.
Williams then filed a motion for discharge which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, he maintains that he was available for trial in December 1977 when he was in Marion County, that the 120-day time limit of Section 941.45(4)(c) has run, and that he is now entitled to a discharge on the escape offense.
It is clear that the New York authorities failed to give notice to Union County that Williams was being brought to Florida as required by the last sentence of Section 941.45(4)(b). Subsection (c) of Section 941.-45(4) states that “[i]n respect of any proceeding made possible by this subsection, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state.... ” Clearly, no “proceeding” has been made possible here because Union County did not even know that Williams was in the State of Florida. In any event, we fail to see why the State of Florida should be denied the right to enforce its criminal laws because of the oversight of the State of New York. The trial court properly denied Williams’ motion for discharge.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Parker v. State, 539 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
-
Leshan Welch v. State, 528 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…ner act. Either way, lack of notice was not due to any action or inaction on the part of Florida officials. Therefore, Florida is not precluded from proceeding against petitioner. Coit v. State, 440 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Williams v. State, 426 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Since petitioner’s motion for discharge was properly denied, the order is sustained in spite of its flawed reasoning. See Savage v. State, 156 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). The petition for writ of prohibition is denied. B…
-
Dozier v. State, 175 So. 3d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…inaction on the part of Florida officials, the state of Florida was not precluded from proceeding against appellant”) (citing Welch v. State, 528 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Coit v. State, 440 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Williams v. State, 426 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). And although the first “notice” — the letter mailed by the petitioner on or about July 10, 2012-was served on the Jacksonville Sheriffs Office, despite mentioning the petitioner’s desire for a speedy disposition of the Duval Co…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence