MARK CARRON, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court answered two certified questions regarding kidnapping with intent to commit another felony: (1) what degree of confinement or movement beyond that inherent in the other felony is required, and (2) what jury instructions are necessary. The Court held that the movement or confinement must be more than slight and incidental, must not be inherent in the other crime, and must have independent significance making the other crime substantially easier or reducing detection risk.
The Court adopted a three-pronged test: the movement or confinement must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other felony; must not be inherent in the nature of the other crime; and must have independent significance by making the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessening the risk of detection. When such a charge is brought, a requested jury instruction containing these essential ingredients should be given, and absent a timely request, its omission is not reversible error.
[1] To convict of kidnapping with intent to commit or facilitate another felony, the movement or confinement must be more than slight, inconsequential, or incidental to the o…
[2] The movement or confinement in kidnapping must not be inherent in the nature of the underlying felony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the offending movement or confinement must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other felony; must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection”
Establishes the three-pronged test required to distinguish kidnapping from other felonies involving incidental movement or confinement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarron was convicted of kidnapping with intent to commit or facilitate another felony. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but…
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McDonald, justice.
The Second District Court of Appeal, after affirming a conviction of kidnapping, has certified two questions to us.1
1. IN ORDER TO CONVICT OF KIDNAPPING WITH INTENT TO COMMIT OR FACILITATE COMMISSION OF ANY FELONY, TO WHAT EXTENT, IF ANY, MUST THERE BE CONFINEMENT OR MOVEMENT WHICH IS NOT INHERENT IN THE NATURE OF THE OTHER FELONY?
2. SHOULD THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED CONCERNING THE REQUISITE CONFINEMENT OR MOVEMENT?
The first question was presented to us in Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1983), where we adopted the position expressed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Harkins v. State, 380 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). In answer to the first question, therefore, we hold that in order for a person to be convicted of kidnapping with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of another felony2 the offending movement or confinement must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other felony; must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection.
Having adopted the three-pronged test we address the second question concerning the proper jury instructions under a charge of violating section 787.01(l)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1979). In the case under review the district court was convinced it should do more than simply read the statute to the members of the jury in order to properly instruct them on the law. It held that where the state charges kidnapping with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony the court should give the jury an instruction containing the es sential ingredients which we have adopted in this opinion. We agree that, should such an instruction be requested by the defendant, it should be given. Absent a timely request for a proper instruction, its omission is not reversible error. In this case, the requested instruction was improper, and there was no error in refusing it.
The decision and opinion of the district court in this cause is approved.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. ADKINS, Acting C.J., concurs in result only.
. Carrón v. State, 414 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We have jurisdiction pursuant to art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. . § 787.01(l)(a)2, Fla.Stat. (1979).
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Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1993)…facilitated So-chor’s acts, avoided detection, and was not merely incidental to, or inherent' in, the crime. Thus, the evidence supports the underlying felony of kidnapping as well as Sochor’s separate conviction of kidnapping. See Carron v. State, 427 So. 2d 192 (Fla.1983); Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1983); Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.1982).5 Sochor next claims that the trial court improperly admitted his confessions because the state did not independently prove the corpus delicti of th…
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Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991)…a facilitated So-chor’s acts, avoided detection, and was not merely incidental to, or inherent in, the crime. Thus, the evidence supports the underlying felony of kidnapping as well as Sochor’s separate conviction of kidnapping. See Carron v. State, 427 So. 2d 192 (Fla.1983); Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1983); Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.1982).5 Sochor next claims that the trial court improperly admitted his confessions because the state did not independently prove the corpus delicti of th…
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Davis v. State, 520 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1988)…d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The district court acknowledged that its prior opinion conflicted with its decision in Taylor v. State, 350 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1221 (Fla.1978), and with our decision in Carron v. State, 427 So. 2d 192 (Fla.1983), which held that where a requested instruction is improper, a court does not commit reversible error in refusing it. Relying on Carron, the en banc court concluded: “[W]hen polygraph evidence is admitted by stipulation, and a party reques…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)
- Mueller v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 380 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Carron v. State, 414 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)