WARREN A. SHANKWEILER A/K/A KENNETH R. WALTERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Shankweiler was convicted of violating probation on two counts after pleading guilty to criminal trespass and being an accessory after the fact in 1981. The appellate court affirmed the probation violation conviction for accessory after the fact but reversed the criminal trespass conviction, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the maximum probationary period for that offense had expired before revocation proceedings were initiated.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a violation of the criminal trespass probationary period because the maximum probationary period of six months had expired long before the revocation affidavit was filed. Upon expiration of a probationary period, the court is divested of all jurisdiction unless revocation or modification proceedings have been initiated prior to that expiration.
[1] A court is divested of jurisdiction over a probationer upon the expiration of the probationary period, unless proceedings for revocation or modification were initiated pr…
[2] A probationary period for criminal trespass, as defined by statute, cannot exceed six months.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is fundamental that upon expiration of a probationary period, the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the probationer unless prior to that time the processes of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of probation.”
Establishes the core jurisdictional principle that trial courts lose authority over probationers once the probationary period expires unless revocation proceedings were already initiated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn July 1981, the defendant entered guilty pleas to criminal trespass (a misdemeanor) and being an accessory after the fact (a third degree felony). T…
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PER CURIAM.
In July, 1981, the defendant entered pleas of guilty to criminal trespass (a misdemean-or with a possible probationary period of six months), and to being an accessory after the fact (a third degree felony with a possible probationary period of five years). The trial court withheld adjudication on both counts and placed the defendant on probation for concurrent terms of three years. The defendant, at that time, failed to contest the probationary period for criminal trespass. On May 14, 1982, the defendant was found guilty of violating probation. The court imposed a sentence of sixty days for criminal trespass and five years for accessory after the fact, both sentences to run concurrently.
There is substantial competent evidence in the record to justify the court’s revocation of probation. Therefore, we affirm the defendant’s conviction for being an accessory after the fact but, for the following reason, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass. It is fundamental that upon expiration of a probationary period, the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the probationer unless prior to that time the processes of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of probation. Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981); Kimble v. State, 396 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The maximum probationary period for criminal trespass is six months, see Section 948.04, Florida Statutes (1981), and since that period had expired long before the date on which the affidavit of violation of probation was filed in this case, we hold that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider a violation of the criminal trespass probationary period.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand with instructions to vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for criminal trespass.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
LETTS, C.J., and HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Rudolpho Richter v. State, 629 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…or warrant for Appellant’s violation for failure to pay restitution was pending when the term expired. Thereafter, the court had no jurisdiction to modify or extend the probation. Cf. Clark v. State, 579 So. 2d 109 (Fla.1991); Shankweiler v. State, 427 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Frederick v. State, 405 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We remand with directions to vacate any orders entered subsequent to the April 23, 1992 termination date. HERSEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.…
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Dent v. State, 455 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…isdiction on October 14, 1976, to place the defendant on probation for three years, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider an affidavit for violation of this probation which was not filed until September 28, 1983. Shankweiler v. State, 427 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). As to count I in case no. 74-9865, see also Mounts v. State, 421 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).…
Authorities Cited
- Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Kimble v. State, 396 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)