ANTONIO B. MORALES AND MARIA MORALES, APPELLANTS,
v.
CARLOS COSTA AND MARY COSTA, SECURITY MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, CITY OF MIAMI, AND COUNTY OF DADE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident sued adjacent landowners, alleging the landowners obstructed a stop sign by planting a tree in the public right-of-way. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landowners based on the rule that landowners owe no duty to motorists. The appellate court reversed, holding that landowners may be liable for obstructions that protrude into public rights-of-way, even if rooted on private property.
A landowner may incur liability for obstructions to a public right-of-way, including obstructions that originate from private property but protrude into the public way. The court distinguished between obstructions entirely on private property (where no duty is owed) and obstructions affecting public rights-of-way (where liability may attach).
[1] A landowner may incur liability for damages caused by an obstruction upon a public way.
[2] A landowner generally has no duty to maintain private property to protect motorists using an adjacent highway from other approaching motorists, absent legislation imposin…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On the other hand, an obstruction of a public right-of-way by an adjacent landowner, even by something which grows and exists upon a private property, but which protrudes into and obstructs the public right-of-way, is. an entirely different matter.”
Establishes the key distinction between obstructions entirely on private property versus those protruding into public rights-of-way
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs Morales were injured in an intersectional automobile accident. They sued the Costas, who owned land adjacent to the intersection, alleging …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
NESBITT, Judge.
The plaintiffs were injured in an intersec-tional automobile accident. They instituted this action against the Costas, who owned land adjacent to the intersection. The com plaint alleged that the Costas obstructed the plaintiffs view of a stop sign by: (a) planting a black olive tree in the swale area; and (b) voluntarily assuming the duty of the maintenance of that area and negligently failing to fulfill that obligation. The trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of the landowners, ostensibly because it found that the landowner owed no duty to a passing motorist for the obstruction of a public right-of-way. We reverse.
The defendant attempts to support the appealed judgment by relying upon Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for review denied, 399 So. 2d 1142 (Fla.1981). There, we held that in the absence of legislation imposing a duty, a landowner had no duty to maintain his property in a condition so as to protect a motorist using the adjacent highway from other approaching motorists. In Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), the court, following Evans, supra, found that a landowner had no duty to a motorist where a tree planted on private property obscured a motorist’s view of a stop sign.1 These decisions, then, recognize that a landowner has a right to use and enjoy his property in any manner he sees fit.
On the other hand, an obstruction of a public right-of-way by an adjacent landowner, even by something which grows and exists upon a private property, but which protrudes into and obstructs the public right-of-way, is. an entirely different matter. The court, in Evans, specifically excluded the situation where an obstruction protruded onto public property. The users of a public right-of-way have a right to expect that it will not be unreasonably obstructed. In contrast, they have no such expectations with respect to lands that are entirely within the purview of private ownership. Consequently, a private person may incur liability for damages caused by an obstruction upon a public way. 39 Am. Jur.2d Highways, Streets & Bridges §§ 359, 361 (1968); 29 Fla.Jur.2d Highways, Streets & Bridges § 118 (1981); see Gulf Refining Co. v. Gilmore, 112 Fla. 366, 152 So. 621 (1934) (plaintiff recovered a judgment against defendant for injuries received when she tripped over a dark cord placed across a grass plot between the curb and the paved sidewalk); see also Price v. Parks, 127 Fla. 744, 173 So. 903 (1937).
Because we find, contrary to the trial court, that a landowner may be liable for obstructions to the public right-of-way, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
. Although the court, in Pedigo v. Smith, supra, did not state it explicitly, we assume that the tree was located entirely on private property.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2007)…. 2d 59, 60-61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (reversing summary judgment in favor of a defendant landowner where foliage protruding from defendant’s property into the public right-of-way obstructed approaching motorist’s view of a stop sign); Morales v. Costa, 427 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (same). Indeed, the Fifth District’s opinion on rehearing correctly notes that Florida courts had recognized the duty of a landowner to adjacent motorists in cases preceding our holding in Whitt: For example, a private non-…1 / 3
-
Ileana Whitt v. Eli Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2001)…property that did not protrude onto the public way. See id. The holding relied upon the so-called “agrarian rule,” which provides that a “landowner has a right to use and enjoy his property in any manner he sees fit.” Id. (quoting Morales v. Costa, 427 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).3 LAW AND ANALYSIS While we conclude that the district court’s application of a rule of no liability under the circumstances presented is inconsistent with our analysis in McCain, we must acknowledge there is a distinct la…1 / 2
-
Armas v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 429 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…duty existed as to these three defendants, the trial judge granted summary judgments in their favor. Largely on the basis of decisions rendered since his rulings, we reverse each of these judgments. In the almost identical case of Morales v. Costa, 427 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983),3 we recently stated that a landowner may be liable for the maintenance of vegetation “which grows and exists [on] private property, but which protrudes into [the] public right-of-way,” so as to obstruct a stop sign located there.…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Evans v. S. Holding Corp. & Ins. Co. of N. Am., 391 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Price v. Parks, 127 Fla. 744 (Fla. 1937)
- Gulf Ref. Co. v. Nannie P. Gilmore, 112 Fla. 366 (Fla. 1933)
- Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)