FOSTER'S AUTO CRUSHING, ET AL. AND CHUBB GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,

v.

DONALD WOOD, APPELLEE

WENTWORTH, Judge.

The employer/carrier appeal an order of the deputy commissioner authorizing a psychiatric evaluation and awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm.

Claimant was injured in a compensable accident on January 8, 1981, when he was hit in the forehead with a lead pipe. He suffered a frontal sinus fracture which required surgery to remove the fractured bone and the contents of the sinus. Fat was removed from claimant’s abdomen and inserted into the sinus area in an attempt to prevent facial deformity. The bone fragments were then wired back into their original position. On March 23, 1981 claimant sought authorization to be seen by a dentist, and on April 16, 1981 he sought authorization for a plastic surgeon and a neurologist. A hearing was set for May 14, 1981 on these requests, but on May 12, 1981 the additional medical care was authorized.

Later claimant returned home to southern Alabama and on July 13,1981 requested a doctor in the Pensacola area. This request was also denied, and at the same time the employer/carrier cut off claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The claimant then went to Dr. Chicóla on his own. Dr. Chicóla performed exploratory surgery on July 14, 1981, which revealed that the abdominal tissue which had been implanted in the sinus area had become infected. On July 17, 1981, Dr. Chicóla performed a sinus ablation: a complete elimination of the sinus with no attempt at reconstruction. As a result, claimant was left with a collapsed forehead. Dr. Chicóla indicated that it could be years before he could recommend attempted correction of the deformity by plastic surgery. He testified that whenever the correction was attempted, there could be complications, and follow up treatment “at least for a few years” would be necessary.

On July 27, 1981 claimant’s attorney sought reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits and again requested additional medical treatment, this time specif ically requesting authorization of Dr. Chicó-la. Authorization was not granted, and a hearing was set for October 5, 1981. The employer/carrier also set Dr. Chicola’s deposition for October 1, 1981, but on September 16, Dr. Chicóla was authorized, temporary total disability was reinstated, and the October 15 hearing was then cancelled.

On November 19, 1981 claimant’s attorney sought authorization for a psychiatric evaluation.1 Once again the claim was denied, and a hearing was held on January 20, 1981. At the hearing, claimant’s attorney introduced a medical report of Dr. Robert, a neurosurgeon who had been involved in claimant’s initial treatment and who was authorized by the employer/carrier.2 The report contains the following comment:

There appears to be considerable emotional overlay which may well be the reason for the persistence of his symptoms.

The attorney for the employer/carrier objected to admission of the report on grounds of hearsay. The deputy agreed that the report was hearsay but admitted it with the explanation that there was no doubt about its authenticity; that the general reasons for sustaining objections to hearsay were not present in this case; and that a deposition 3 would involve an extraordinary burden in the particular circumstances presented. The deputy ordered the psychiatric evaluation and awarded attorney’s fees based on a finding of bad faith. § 440.-34(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981).

In Butch’s Concrete v. Henderson, 414 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), we reversed the admission of unauthenticated medical reports, which had been admitted for reasons similar in part to those expressed by the order now on appeal. We find that reversal is not appropriate in this case, however, for two reasons. First, the report here does not fall within the statutory definition of hearsay4 because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The matter asserted was an orthopedist’s opinion that claimant had an emotional overlay. The report was offered only to prove that there was reason to authorize an evaluation to determine if claimant had a psychiatric condition, and if so, to determine its cause. The unauthenticated medical report therefore was not, under the circumstances described, excludable as hearsay.

Affirmance is also proper because the opinion of Dr. Robert was adopted verbatim by Dr. Chicóla in his deposition.5 Thus, the evidence was strictly cumulative so that, even assuming error in its admission, such error was harmless. Ocala Veterinary Hospital v. Scardo, IRC Order 2-3630 (1978). In addition to agreeing with Dr. Robert’s quoted opinion, Dr. Chicóla testified that he knew that claimant was depressed and anxious concerning his deformity, that he had told claimant that correction would be risky, and that possibly.it would never be successful. Therefore, in spite of Dr. Chicola’s statement that he did not consider the evaluation necessary, there is competent substantial evidence supporting the finding of entitlement to such diagnostic care.

The recited facts support the deputy’s determination of bad faith in the handling of the claim.

The order is accordingly affirmed.

BOOTH, J., concurs.

THOMPSON, J., dissents with opinion.

. The claim was for examination only, not for treatment.

. Thus, the employer/carrier had possession of the report prior to the hearing, the report being dated June 18, 1981.

. Dr. Robert was located in the Orlando area where the accident occurred. As mentioned, claimant was residing in southern Alabama at the time of the hearing.

.§ 90.801(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1981).

. In finding claimant entitled to an evaluation the deputy stated that he had accepted the medical testimony of Dr. Robert over Dr. Chi-cóla. We construe this statement as referring to those areas where Dr. Chicola’s testimony conflicted with Dr. Robert.

[*1011] THOMPSON, Judge,

dissenting.

I dissent.

The sole benefit claimed at the hearing in this case was authorization for a psychiatric evaluation. The only benefits awarded by the deputy was the authorization of a psychiatric evaluation and follow-up treatment if necessary. This is a claim for medical benefits only and whether an attorney’s fee is awarded should be dependent upon whether medical benefits were awarded and not bad faith.

At the hearing the deputy admitted into evidence a medical report of Dr. Robert, a neurosurgeon who had initially treated the claimant. The report contained a statement that the claimant appeared to have a considerable emotional overlay which might well be the reason for the persistence of his symptoms. The E/C objected to the admission of the report on the grounds of hearsay. Although he agreed the report was hearsay, the deputy admitted it, finding that there was no doubt about its authenticity, that the general reasons for sustaining hearsay objections were not present, and that a deposition would involve an extraordinary burden in this case. The deputy awarded a psychiatric evaluation and follow-up treatment, if necessary, and in so doing, specifically “accepted the medical testimony of Dr. Robert, by report dated June 18, 1981, over that of Dr. Chicóla.”

The sole benefit sought and the sole benefits awarded were based only on the report of Dr. Robert which was introduced into evidence over E/C’s objection.

Therefore, the report was not only offered, but was also accepted, to prove the truth of the matter claimed or asserted. Even assuming, as the deputy did, that the E/C were familiar with the report and there was no question of its authenticity, the report is inadmissible. Hearsay is an oral or written statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. § 90.801, Fla.Stat. (1981).

Hearsay is inadmissible for three reasons: (1) the declarant does not testify under oath; (2) the trier of fact cannot observe the declarant’s demeanor; and (3) the declarant is not subject to cross-examination. Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1982); State v. Freber, 366 So. 2d 426 (Fla.1978).

Contrary to the deputy’s finding that the general reasons for sustaining an objection to hearsay were not present, all three major reasons for applying the hearsay rule exist in this ease. This court has consistently held that medical reports are hearsay and should not be admitted over objection. It has been specifically held that the cost of a doctor’s deposition is not a sufficient excuse for not taking it, particularly since the cost is paid by the E/C, not the claimant, if the claim is compensable. Butch’s Concrete v. Henderson, 414 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Osceola County Commissioners v. Thomas, 416 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Q: Doctor, would you agree or disagree with the statement in Dr. Roberts’ comments here that there appears to be a considerable emotional overlay which may well be the reason for the persistence of his symptoms. Would you agree or disagree with that?

I would reverse the deputy’s order awarding psychiatric evaluation and treatment, if necessary, which was based solely upon inadmissible hearsay, and I would reverse the award of an attorney’s fee to claimant’s attorney.

WENTWORTH, Judge.

By motion for rehearing appellants re-argue the merits of the issues treated by the opinion, contrary to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(a). We adhere to our original opinion finding (1) no reversible error in the deputy’s reliance on a disputed medical report with which an undisputed medical witness expressly agreed,1 and alternatively (2) that under the circumstances in question the report was not within the statutory hearsay proscription applied in Butch’s Concrete, supra.

A: I would agree with that. BOOTH, J., concurs.

THOMPSON, J., dissents without opinion.

. The record reflects inquiry of appellants’ medical witness as to the pertinent portion of the report: