FRANK J. BARANKO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Baranko appeals his two-year sentence imposed after remand for resentencing, challenging the trial court's denial of a psychiatric examination to determine his sanity at sentencing. The appellate court affirms the sentence, finding that Baranko failed to present sufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds for questioning his mental competency under Florida law.
The trial court properly denied the request for further psychiatric examination because Baranko failed to present sufficient evidence establishing reasonable grounds to believe he was insane under Florida law. A defendant's sanity at sentencing is not questioned merely by evidence of personality disorders or psychiatric housing when the defendant demonstrates rational understanding of proceedings and competent consultation with counsel.
[1] A defendant seeking a psychiatric examination to determine sanity at sentencing must present sufficient proof to establish reasonable grounds necessitating such examinati…
[2] A court is not required to appoint experts to determine a defendant's sanity at sentencing when the defendant's presentation of evidence is inadequate to establish reason…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A person is incompetent to stand trial ... if he does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or if he has no rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.”
The statutory standard for incompetency that Baranko failed to meet; establishes the legal threshold for requiring psychiatric examination.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBaranko's conviction was previously affirmed but the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. At the resentencing hearing, Baranko…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Baranko appeals from a two-year sentence imposed following this Court’s previous affirmance of his conviction but vacating the initial sentence and remanding for a new sentencing hearing.1
Upon remand, both Baranko and his counsel filed notices of intent to reclaim insanity as a defense to sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that appellant was suffering from an antisocial personality disorder and as such should be provided an independent examination to determine his sanity before sentencing. Baranko submitted that in addition to the several psychiatrists being in accord that he suffered from passive aggressive personality, the prison considered him a psychiatric patient and housed him in a psychiatric cell. He suggests that even though this evidence does not conclusively show him to be insane, it does show abnormal behavior and provides sufficient grounds requiring the court to appoint experts to determine his sanity at the time of sentencing, citing Rule 3.740, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In denying further psychiatric examination of Baranko, the trial judge stated that he had reviewed the medical reports and the psychological report which was requested and ordered by the court prior to trial; that the court found appellant still presumed to be sane and from the court’s observations of appellant, as well as the court’s knowledge of various pleadings that appellant filed and correspondence appellant exchanged, it concluded that there was not sufficient proof of insanity before the court and that appellant was competent and did not meet the legal standard of insanity to preclude sentencing.
Section 916.12(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides:
A person is incompetent to stand trial ... if he does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or if he has no rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.
Baranko clearly would not meet that description. He obviously understood the proceedings, evidenced no difficulty in conferring rationally with his counsel and finally persuaded the trial judge that he should take over the defense of his case without further assistance of the public defender. Although Baranko’s legal skills may be questioned, his sanity was not shown by him to be other than intact.
Appellant’s reliance upon Boggs v. State, 375 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) is misplaced. In Boggs, the jail psychiatrist had notified the public defender that the defendant did not have a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and did not understand the proceedings against him. That situation is not present here.
Criminal Rule 3.740 provides that if the court has reasonable ground to believe the defendant is insane it should hold a hearing to determine the defendant’s mental condition. The ordered sentencing hearing afforded Baranko the opportunity to present new evidence and additional reports. We agree with the trial judge as the record fully supports his conclusion that Baranko’s presentation was fatally inadequate to establish reasonable grounds necessitating further proceedings under Rule 3.740.
Accordingly, the trial court’s imposition of sentence is affirmed.
BOOTH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. . Baranko v. State, 406 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Pericola v. State, 499 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…ct of that defense.” Hayes v. State, 343 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). At the sentencing phase, a defendant has been found guilty; no further defense “in the criminal arena” need be conducted. Finally, this court’s decision in Baranko v. State, 428 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) does not mandate the result sought by Pericola, as an actual determination of insanity was not involved therein. Although neither Rule 3.720 nor its predecessor statute, Section 921.09, Florida Statutes (1969), define “insanity”…
Authorities Cited
- Baranko v. State, 406 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Boggs v. State, 375 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)