AARON LEVY, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT COX, SR., APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court denied a rehearing, affirming a prior decision that the appellee was not in adverse possession at the time of the appellant's purchase. The court found the appellant's claims unsupported by the record.
No, the appellee was not in adverse possession at the time of the appellant's purchase. The record does not support this contention.
“The contention that Cox was in adverse possession at th'e time of Levy’s purchase is not supported by the record.”
Establishes the court's finding regarding adverse possession.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant, Levy, purchased property. The appellee, Cox, contended he was in adverse possession at the time of the purchase. Testimony indicated th…
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Mr. Justice Raney
delivered the opinion of the court:
In so far as the points urged in the petition for a rehearing are concerned I think, after a careful consideration of them, that there is no ground shown for granting it.
The testimony of Lively, and others, shows that Lively was in possession by his tenant, and collecting rents at the time of Levy’s purchase. Cox’s testimony upon this point is as follows: “ Question—When Mr. Lively was renting out your house and collecting the rents, what did you do ? Answer—I did not bother about it. I thought I would let him get back some of the taxes he had been paying on the place.” The contention that Cox was in adverse possession at th'e time of Levy’s purchase is not supported by the record.
This is not a case of contention between grantor and grantee, as to delivery of a deed, and, consequently, the authorities cited by counsel for Cox are not in point, Williams, the grantor in the deed, does not question the delivery. Cox took the deed, to say the most that can be said for him, in his son’s name, and as between him and an innocent purchaser for value from the son, cannot dispute the delivery.
I think the re-hearing should be denied, and the other judges concur in this conclusion.
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Ellis v. Clark, 39 Fla. 714 (Fla. 1897)…f the court in reference te the ‘delivery of the deed to B. F. Cox was to [*724] hold that the deed, being recorded five days after its-execution, was equivalent to a delivery so far as Levy,, the innocent purchaser, was concerned. See Levy vs. Cox, 22 Fla. 580. • Although plaintiff in error introduced evidence, without objection, that he never delivered the deed to-his son, and that the record of it was not designed to-have such effect, yet the jury could not, consistently wdth the instruction given, acc…
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Cape Sable Corp. v. Elwood M. McCLURG, 74 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1954)…. question whether ejectment may be maintained upon an equitable estoppel, the fact remains that as early .as 1886 this Court allowed recovery in ejectment by a plaintiff in whose favor an estoppel in pais was invoked. Levy v. Cox, 22 Fla. 546, Id., 22 Fla. 580. And in 1910 this Court recognized, in Erwin v. Dekle, 60 Fla. 56, 53 So. 441, that there might be situations where an action of ejectment, would lie based upon a title by estoppel. It is true that in the Erwin case the Court. refused to apply the d…