RONALD R. MORRIS AND DEWIGHT I. WRIGHT, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a defective pleading of the intent element in a robbery charge is waived if not raised at trial.
Appellants were convicted of robbery and challenged their convictions on appeal for the first time, arguing the charging information omitted the essen…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants raise numerous issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion. Appellants challenge for the first time on appeal the information under which they were charged and convicted for robbery on the ground that it omits the essential element of specific intent to permanently deprive 1 the owner of his property. We have reviewed the information and conclude that that element of intent was merely defectively or imperfectly pled,2 and thus appellants have waived their right to raise the defect on appeal.
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
BOOTH and WENTWORTH, JJ., and McCORD (Retired), Associate, J., concur. . This opinion should not be construed as addressing the issue of whether the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property remains an essential element of robbery. Compare State v. McNeill, 407 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), and Baxley v. State, 411 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (Justice Cowart, dissenting opinion), reversed, State v. Dunmann, 427 So. 2d 166, 1983 FLW 18 (Fla.1983), with Green v. State, 414 So. 2d 1171, 1172 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
. The intent is involved in the averment of the completed act; the unlawful taking by force of the property of another. The term “to take away by force” is equivalent in meaning to the term “steals,” see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged. The word “steal” sufficiently implies the intention to deprive the owner of his property. Green v. State, 414 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
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Kearse v. State, 464 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…efendant permission to file an additional motion, the motion was untimely. We further hold that the information, which alleged “taken by force, violence, assault or putting in fear” is sufficient, as was held in the similar case of Morris v. State, 428 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In that case “to take away by force” was held to be equivalent to “steal”, which is sufficient to imply intent to permanently deprive the owner. We note however, that the language is not as clearly worded as it could be. In Gask…
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Denton v. State (Fla. 4th DCA 2026)
Authorities Cited
- State v. Dunmann, 427 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1983)
- Green v. State, 414 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Burnice C. Baxley v. State, 411 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. McNEILL, 407 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)