JAMES B. ZUCCARELLO, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA COLLINS ZUCCARELLO A/K/A CAROL L. COLLINS, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1983-04-05
Nos. 82-2531, 82-2532 and 82-2648
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
429 So. 2d 68 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1983) Caution
Cited by 20 cases

Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

Despite its title, the agreement of the parties incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution was not a true “property settlement agreement” since it did not involve an exchange of financial rights or obligations. Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228, 229 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). It follows, even though the contract recited that the wife “waive[d] all alimony claims,” that the husband’s undertaking to pay her $20,000 in 120 monthly payments of $222 each was not a mere debt1 but rather served to discharge an obligation to support her. Brisco v. Brisco, 355 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Contrary to the appellant’s position, it was therefore properly deemed enforceable by contempt. See Lamm v. Chapman, 413 So. 2d 749 (Fla.1982); compare, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).

Affirmed.

. Another indication which leads to this conclusion is that it was specifically agreed that the obligation was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1979) (alimony or support not dischargeable).


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Cited By

  • Ball v. Ball, 440 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …as a part of the adjustment of the parties’ property and financial matters, unconnected with family support obligations, and must fall into the category of a property settlement agreement. We thus distinguish this case from Zuccarello v. Zuccarello, 429 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983), and Brisco v. Brisco, 355 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1978). In Zuccarello, although the stipulation incorporated in the final judgment recited that the wife waived all alimony claimed, the husband’s undertaking to pay her $20,000.…
  • Boyd v. Boyd, 478 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …gh the clause speaks of “Lump Sum Alimony,” its legal effect is determined not by what it is called, but by what it does. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1953); Karch v. Karch, 445 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Zuccarello v. Zuccarello, 429 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). By definition, “lump sum alimony” is a fixed and certain amount, the right to which is vested in the recipient and which is not therefore subject to increase, reduction, or termination in the event of any contingency, specificall…
  • Pabian v. Pabian, 480 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
    …ent of property rights; the latter concerns payments considered to be alimony or support, which are enforceable by contempt. 58 Fla. Bar Journal 67, The Contempt Dilemma: Support vs. Property and Third Party Debts. See also Zuccarello v. Zuccarello, 429 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Cobb v. Cobb, 399 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We believe that the husband’s obligation to pay the wife’s automobile payments is in the nature of support rather than a settlement of property rights because of the prominent rol…

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