FLAGSHIP NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE THOMAS A. TESTA, GRAY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, INC., GDS, INC., GRAY TOBACCO COMPANY, INC., SAMUEL GRAY AND MARILYN GRAY, RESPONDENTS
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Flagship National Bank petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to rule on a settlement agreement dispute after completing a non-jury bench trial. The Florida appellate court granted the writ, holding that a trial judge has no authority to sua sponte order a jury trial after the parties have agreed to and completed a non-jury trial.
A trial judge has no authority or discretion to order a jury trial sua sponte after an agreed-to non-jury trial has been completed. Mandamus lies to compel the trial judge to render a decision on the issues raised at the bench trial, as it is the duty of a judge to exercise judicial functions and make necessary orders regardless of personal preference when no legal disqualification exists.
[1] Mandamus will issue to compel a lower court to rule on a matter within its jurisdiction when it neglects or refuses to act without sufficient reason and the aggrieved par…
[2] A trial court has no authority to order a jury trial on its own motion after an agreed-to non-jury trial has been completed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“while a judge may not be told ahead of time how to rule, mandamus lies to require that he rule one way or the other, if there is no justification that the ruling be withheld.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that mandamus can compel judicial action when a judge refuses to rule without legal justification
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties agreed to a non-jury trial before the trial judge on whether a previous settlement agreement should be set aside. The trial judge conducte…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the lower court, sitting non-jury, conducted a full two-day trial on the issue of whether a previous settlement agreement should be set aside. After receiving extensive post-trial memoranda, however, the trial judge sua sponte entered an order declining to rule on the matter and requiring instead that it be determined by a jury in a separate, subsequent trial. One of the parties1 has filed this petition for a writ of mandamus which seeks essentially that the trial court be directed itself to resolve the controversy. We grant the writ.
It is a legal shibboleth — and, uncommonly, an accurate one — that while a judge may not be told ahead of time how to rule, mandamus lies to require that he rule one way or the other, if there is no justification that the ruling be withheld. In re Gross-mayer, 177 U.S. 48, 20 S.Ct. 535, 44 L.Ed. 665 (1900); Steccone v. Morse-Starrett Products Co., 191 F. 2d 197 (9th Cir.1951), and cases collected at note 5; 52 Am.Jur.2d Mandamus §§ 342, 344 (1970); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 101 (1947); see Department of Business Regulation v. Hyman, 417 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla.1982); City of Miami v. Southeast First National Bank of Miami, 320 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 465 (Fla.1976). As is said generally in 35 Fla.Jur.2d Mandamus and Prohibition § 81 (1982):
If a lower court, without sufficient reason, neglects or refuses to act on a matter within its jurisdiction, properly brought before it, mandamus will issue at the instance of one entitled to invoke the remedy, to compel it to assume jurisdiction and proceed to a determination of the cause, unless the aggrieved party has an adequate remedy by appeal, [footnotes omitted]
This principle applies here.
The trial judge apparently based his abstention on the ground that he thought it preferable that a jury resolve the somewhat sensitive matters2 which were involved in the issue he had tried. This provides no lawful basis for the court’s failure to rule. It seems clear — and we have discovered no contrary decision — that a trial court has no authority or discretion to order a jury trial, on its own motion, after an agreed to non-jury trial has been completed.3 Tobin v. Shwitzer, 162 Misc. 747, 295 N.Y.S. 590 (Bronx City Ct.1934); Annot., Authority of State Court to Order Jury Trial In Civil Case Where Jury Has Been Waived Or Not Demanded By Parties, 9 A.L.R. 4th 1041, 1049-51 (1981). It thus remains the duty of the lower court now to render its decision upon the subject of the trial. See State ex rel. Locke v. Sandler, 156 Fla. 136, 23 So. 2d 276, 278 (1945); State ex rel. Palmer v. Atkinson, 116 Fla. 366, 156 So. 726, 728 (1934) (“It is the duty of a circuit judge who is eligible and competent to sit in a cause, to exercise his judicial functions therein, and to make all necessary orders and decrees pertaining thereto, regardless of his personal embarrassment, or his feelings of delicacy or other considerations, where same do not amount to a legal ¡disqualification to sit and render judgment in the cause.”).
We therefore order that the respondent judge enter, with all deliberate speed, an order or judgment on the issues raised by Count VI of the counterclaim as presented at the non-jury trial conducted on March 25, 1982 and May 20, 1982.
Mandamus granted.
. The other side has stated no real objection to the petition.
. It was alleged that a previous attorney for the respondents had, during his representation, secured loans from the petitioner bank.
.The rule may be different if the court acts before trial and if the parties have not themselves expressly waived a jury. See Shores v. Murphy, 88 So. 2d 294 (Fla.1956); Bardee Corp. v. Arnold Altex Aluminum Co., 134 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); cases collected, Annot., infra, 9 A.L.R. 4th at 1069-72.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
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Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…n in order to permit the jury to decide the issue, Flagship petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to resolve the controversy. This court ordered the trial court to decide the matter. Flagship National Bank v. Testa, 429 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). On remand, the trial court entered a judgment against Flagship on Count VI. Flagship appealed. We affirmed on the basis that the settlement agreement was procured “in part through the breach of the fidelity owed to the [Grays] by…
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Quintana v. The Honorable Frederick N. Barad, 528 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…498 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (“mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a trial court to exercise its judicial authority and decide a cause, where there is no valid reason to reserve ruling on the matter”); Flagship Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Testa, 429 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“mandamus lies to require that [the judge] rule one way or the other if there is no justification that the ruling be withheld.”). Here, the trial judge ordered petitioner to furnish notice to a non-party before he would rule…
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Miami Heat Ltd. P'ship v. Leahy, 682 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…r in the ultimate end sought, not in the details or steps leading to the end”). . There was thus ample “justification that the ruling be withheld” so that mandamus does not lie to compel a decision at this time. See Flagship National Bank v. Testa, 429 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). . Technically speaking, reliance on this ground for affirmance would obviate the need for ruling on the validity of the ordinance.…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Vazquez v. Ailyn M. Rebaza Smith (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
- Dep't OF Bus. Reg. v. Hyman, 417 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1982)
- State v. Atkinson, 116 Fla. 366 (Fla. 1934)
- In re Grossmayer, 177 U.S. 48 (U.S. 1900)
- Steccone v. Morse-Starrett Prods. Co., 191 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951)
- Martin v. Green, 134 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Shores v. Ida Murphy and her husband, 88 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1956)
- State v. Honorable Harry N. Sandler, 156 Fla. 136 (Fla. 1945)
- The City OF Miami v. Se. First Nat'l Bank OF Miami, 320 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)