ALBERT TERRELL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Terrell was convicted of cocaine possession based on a warrantless arrest following an informant's tip. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the informant's tip lacked the required 'basis of knowledge' prong under Aguilar v. Texas, meaning there was no probable cause for the arrest and the subsequent search was unlawful.
The court held that the informant's tip failed to satisfy the 'basis of knowledge' prong of Aguilar because there was no testimony establishing that the informant personally observed the alleged activity or obtained the information from a credible and reliable source. Therefore, no probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest, and the subsequent search was unlawful.
[1] An informant's tip lacking "underlying circumstances" from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where they were claimed to be fails to satisfy the "basis…
[2] The "basis of knowledge" prong of Aguilar requires ascertainment of the source of the raw data provided by an informant, not merely the informant's general reliability.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the informant's tip (that Terrell "has cocaine in his car right now and is trying to sell it") which led to the defendant's warrantless arrest and the subsequent contraband-revealing search of Terrell utterly failed to apprise the arresting officer of any "underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed them to be,"”
Establishes that the tip lacked the necessary underlying circumstances required under Aguilar for probable cause
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn informant provided a tip to police that Terrell 'has cocaine in his car right now and is trying to sell it.' Based solely on this tip, officers arr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Basis Of Knowledge Prong cases and more on FLexlaw
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
Upon a plea of nolo contendere specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his concededly dispositive motion to suppress, Terrell was adjudicated guilty of possession of cocaine.
We reverse the judgment of conviction with directions to discharge the defendant. The informant’s tip (that Terrell “has cocaine in his car right now and is trying to sell it”) which led to the defendant’s war-rantless arrest and the subsequent contraband-revealing search of Terrell utterly failed to apprise the arresting officer of any “underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed them to be,” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 729 (1964), and, therefore, notwithstanding the conceded reliability of the informant himself, because the “basis of knowledge” prong of Aguilar was not satisfied, no probable cause to arrest the defendant existed.
“The ‘basis of knowledge’ prong [of Agui-la r] assumes an informant’s ‘veracity,’ and then proceeds to probe and test its conclusion: (‘What are the raw facts upon which the informant based his conclusion?’ ‘How did the informant obtain those facts?’ ‘What precisely did he see or hear or smell or touch firsthand?’ ‘If he heard the facts from someone else, what makes that third person “credible” and how did that third person come by the knowledge?’).
The judge must ascertain the source for the raw data — the product of someone’s senses — and then weigh that data for himself. He is concerned not with that part of an affidavit or testimony-which provides information about the informant but with the recitation of the story coming from the informant.” Stanley v. State, 19 Md.App. 507, 531, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (1974) (emphasis in original).
In the present case, the arresting officer gave no testimony from which the conclusion could have been drawn that the informant himself had seen the activities about which he spoke, or that although not personally observing these activities, the informant had learned of them from a credible and reliable source. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) (White, J., concurring); Reed v. State, 267 So. 2d 70 (Fla.1972).
From all that appears, the informant here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in Terrell’s possession. As in so many like cases, the failure to satisfy this “basis of knowledge” prong of Aguilar renders the defendant’s arrest and search incident thereto unlawful. See, e.g., Andersen v. State, 274 So. 2d 228 (Fla.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S.Ct. 150, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973); M.J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); United States v. Colon, 559 F. 2d 1380 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Chavez, 482 F. 2d 1268 (5th Cir.1973); United States v. Long, 439 F. 2d 628 (D.C.Cir.1971); Horzempa v. State, 292 Ala. 140, 290 So. 2d 220 (1974); Halpin v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 6 Cal.3d 885, 101 Cal.Rptr. 375, 495 P. 2d 1295, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982, 93 S.Ct. 318, 34 L.Ed.2d 246 (1972); State v. Richards, 357 So. 2d 1128 (La.1978); State v. Smith, 350 So. 2d 1178 (La.1977); State v. Humble, 309 So. 2d 138 (La.1975); State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W. 2d 401 (N.D.1979); People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 406 N.E. 2d 471, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1980); People v. West, 44 N.Y.2d 656, 376 N.E. 2d 190, 405 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1978); People v. Wirchansky, 41 N.Y.2d 130, 359 N.E. 2d 666, 391 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1976).
Reversed with directions to discharge the defendant.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Maya, 529 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…two-pronged test in which the informant’s individual reliability and a showing of the basis of his knowledge were said to be prerequisites to reliance upon his information. But see State v. Rizo, 463 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Terrell v. State, 429 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (informant’s reliability and knowledge remain important factors in assessing probable cause). Instead, the “totality of the circumstances” test, see Skelton, 349 So. 2d at 194, under which all the pertinent factors must be taken i…
-
State v. Rizo, 463 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…o conduct a custodial interrogation without probable cause. Royer. Thus, the photo obtained during the unlawful detention is inadmissible on that ground, Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); see Terrell v. State, 429 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); J.R.H. v. State, 428 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Pirri v. State, 428 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 438 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1983), without consideration of the taint arising from the initial unlawful stop. Wong Sun; Lew…
-
State v. Hewitt, 495 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…based upon double hersay [sic], as distinguished from founded suspicion to detain. Sagonias v. State, 89 So. 2d 252 (Fla., 1956) also dealt with the inability to support a warrantless search of a vehicle based on double hearsay. Terrell v. State, 429 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3 DCA, 1983) gives no details of the officer’s independent observations, so it is assumed that relying solely on the tip, he made the warrantless arrest. Second Issue The search was warrantless which is a violation per se of the Fourth Amend…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (U.S. 1964)
- Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (U.S. 1969)
- Mahin v. Mitchell, 409 U.S. 982 (U.S. 1972)
- Diehl v. United States, 409 U.S. 982 (U.S. 1972)
- M. J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Taylor et vir v. Jones, 414 U.S. 879 (U.S. 1973)
- Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 414 U.S. 879 (U.S. 1973)
- Andersen v. State, 274 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1973)
- United States v. Chavez, 482 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1973)
- Reed v. State, 267 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1972)