SELDEN G. HOOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
C. C. HARTMAN, REAR ADMIRAL USN, COMMANDANT, ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, APPELLEE

9th Cir. | 1959-12-04
No. 16058
274 F.2d 429 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1959) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The court held that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies requires dismissal of proceedings when military adjudication processes are still underway.


Facts & Procedural History

Hooper, a retired Navy admiral, challenged his court-martial for moral offenses. He was not in confinement, and the military court-martial trial was u…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Hooper, a retired admiral of the regular Navy, challenges the right of the Navy to try him before a navy court martial for moral offenses. Unlike Toth in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8, Hooper was not confined or placed under restraint. Thus, there was no basis for habeas corpus in Hooper’s case.

By naming the Commandant of the Eleventh Naval District (San Diego, Calif.) as defendant, Hooper claimed jurisdiction for a district court of this circuit. Hooper has been convicted by the court martial of at least some of the charges against him. However, at the time of oral argument in this court, the court martial trial was undergoing various stages of administrative review and review by the Court of Military Appeals and such reviews are not yet complete. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637. The district court found jurisdiction on one count. Hooper v. Hartman, D.C., 163 F.Supp. 437. However, the ruling below on that count, too, was against Hooper. Although very interesting questions lurk here, we conclude that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies (here the military) is implicit in the trial court’s judgment dismissing the proceed ings and such a holding is correct. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 71 S.Ct. 149, 95 L.Ed. 146.1 Cf. Bland v. Hartman, 9 Cir., 1957, 245 F. 2d 311.2

The judgment is affirmed.

. In Gusik, supra, the Supreme Court ordered the ease held in a court of appeals pending final military determination of the issues, but there a new “administrative” remedy had been created after a habeas corpus proceeding was brought and heard in district court. In Hooper’s case no new military remedies have been created, but the naval military processes of adjudication are still at work. Here Hooper asks us to “hold” his case as was done in Gusik. But when the remedies available to Hooper in the naval forces all existed at the time he came to a federal district court, Gusik clearly calls for dismissal as was ordered below.

. The death of Circuit Judge Fee occurred on August 25, 1959. Therefore, he did not conclude participation in the foregoing decision.


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