FRANKLIN KIMBLE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Franklin Kimble appeals his robbery and burglary convictions, claiming the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself. The court held that while defendants have a constitutional right to self-representation, trial courts must conduct a sufficient inquiry to ensure the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives counsel, and reversal was required because the trial court's inquiry here was inadequate.
The trial court erred in denying Kimble's right to self-representation. Although a defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, and the court may consider unusual circumstances such as the defendant's age, mental condition, education, and experience in criminal proceedings, the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into whether Kimble understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation before denying his clear and unequivocal request.
[1] A defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself, but this right is conditioned upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.
[2] A trial court must conduct an inquiry to determine if a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent before allowing self-representation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although it is clear that a defendant has a right to proceed without counsel, when an accused chooses to do so, an inquiry must be conducted to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently is waiving his constitutional right.”
Establishes the mandatory inquiry requirement before denying self-representation requests
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter being appointed a public defender, Kimble dismissed his attorney and was appointed a second public defender. During jury selection, Kimble reque…
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NESBITT, Judge.
Kimble appeals his conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon and burglary of a dwelling with an assault therein. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to represent himself.
After the defendant was taken into custody, he was adjudged insolvent and the public defender was appointed to represent him. Several weeks later, the defendant sought and obtained the dismissal of his counsel and a second public defender was appointed. The case proceeded to trial. Toward the close of the jury selection process, the defendant advised the court that he wished to fire his attorney because he had not prepared the case to the defendant’s satisfaction. Kimble informed the court that his family was in the process of hiring a private attorney.
The trial court recessed overnight to give the defendant’s family an opportunity to retain counsel. When it appeared the next day that private counsel had not been retained, the trial judge attempted to proceed with the trial. Thereupon, the defendant clearly and unequivocally demanded that he be allowed to represent himself.
The trial court denied his request and the case proceeded to trial. On defendant’s instructions, counsel stood mute during the trial as did the defendant.
Although it is clear that a defendant has a right to proceed without counsel, when an accused chooses to do so, an inquiry must be conducted to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently is waiving his constitutional right. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Robinson v. State, 368 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Ausby v. State, 358 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
In the absence of unusual circumstances, an accused who is mentally competent and sui juris has the right to conduct his own defense. State v. Capetta, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1008, 89 S.Ct. 1610, 22 L.Ed.2d 787 (1969); Williams v. State, 337 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
The unusual circumstances to be considered include whether the accused by reason of his age, mental derangement, lack of knowledge or education, or inexperience in criminal proceedings would be deprived of a fair trial if allowed to conduct his own defense. Robinson v. State, supra. This does not imply that the defendant must have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to competently and intelligently choose self-representation, see Faret-ta v. California, supra; however, it does require that the defendant be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Smith v. State, 407 So. 2d 894 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2260, 72 L.Ed.2d 864 (1982); Costello v. Carlisle, 413 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we must reject as a basis for denying the defendant the right to self-representation, the fact that Kimble stated to the trial judge that he was unqualified. The defendant’s technical knowledge of the law is not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. Faretta v. California, supra. Had the defendant been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and chosen to do so anyway, the defendant would have been entitled to proceed without counsel.1
In the present ease, the record discloses that after the defendant announced a clear and unequivocal desire to represent himself, compare Johnson v. State, 427 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA), the court did no more than inquire as to why the defendant was unhappy with his public defender and ask a few questions concerning his educational background. Because this inquiry was insufficient, see Ausby v. State, supra, we are compelled to reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
. Once a defendant has voluntarily made this choice, he will not thereafter be heard to complain that the quality of his defense amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 834, n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46. While it may seem foreign to our constitutional scheme to allow such inadequate representation, it must be remembered that the defendant will bear the consequences of his conviction and he should therefore be free to choose how he will conduct his defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540.
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Rodriguez v. State, 982 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…retta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. As such, when a defendant unequivocally demands to represent himself, an inquiry must be made to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his constitutional right. See Kimble v. State, 429 So. 2d 1369,1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). When conducting a Faretta inquiry, the “trial court should inquire into, among other things: defendant’s age, mental status, and lack of knowledge and experience in criminal proceedings.” Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863,…
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Lyons v. State, 437 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…v. State, 167 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964); Cappetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th [*712] DCA 1967), rev’d. on other grounds, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla.1968). He contends that there is no credible distinction between his case and Kimble v. State, 429 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); and Martin v. State, 434 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In Kimble, the defendant made his request “toward the end of the jury selection process.” The Third District Court reversed his conviction because the trial court had deni…
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A.T. v. State, 448 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…o. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Brown v. State, 413 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Sections 90.801, 90.-803 and 90.806 Florida Statutes (1983). However, we find the evidence that the appellant was guilty of theft to be insufficient. Danek v. State, 429 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); B.L.W. v. State, 393 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3 DCA 1981). Therefore for the reasons above stated the adjudication of delinquency under review be and the same is hereby reversed with directions to discharge the appellant. Reversed and…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Swedberg, 456 U.S. 984 (U.S. 1982)
- Jacks v. Duckworth, 456 U.S. 984 (U.S. 1982)
- Smith v. State, 407 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Cappetta, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968)
- Ausby v. State, 358 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Cappetta v. Florida, 394 U.S. 1008 (U.S. 1969)
- Tabor v. Virginia, 394 U.S. 1008 (U.S. 1969)
- Gardner v. State, 368 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Robinson v. State, 368 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)