CLAY W. KEITH, APPELLANT,
v.
BRENDA S. DYKES, ET AL., APPELLEE
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Clay Keith, Director of the Division of Drivers Licenses, appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss for improper venue in an action brought by Brenda Dykes. The court held that the cause of action accrued when the Department of Insurance denied the claimants' claim, which occurred after the effective date of the venue statute, making Bay County an appropriate venue.
The court held that appellees' cause of action did not accrue until December 11, 1981, when the Department of Insurance denied their claim, which was after the effective date of Section 768.28(1). Compliance with Section 768.28(6) is a condition precedent to maintaining suit, and the cause of action accrues only when the claim is denied in writing. Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss for improper venue.
[1] A cause of action against the state or its agencies accrues when the claim is denied by the Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency, not when the cause of actio…
[2] Compliance with statutory requirements for presenting a claim to the state or its agencies is a condition precedent to filing suit.
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Establishes that the condition precedent of claim denial must occur before a cause of action accrues for venue purposes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees filed a complaint against appellant in his official capacity as Director of the Division of Drivers Licenses in Bay County Circuit Court. Ap…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellees filed a complaint against appellant, in his official capacity as the Director of the Division of Drivers Licenses of the State of Florida in Bay County Circuit Court. Appellant moved to dismiss and/or abate for improper venue alleging that appellees’ cause of action accrued on September 2, 1981, prior to the effective date of Section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (1981), and therefore this action should have been brought in Leon County, Florida, where the Division maintains its principal headquarters.
Section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (1981), which enlarges venue in actions brought against the sovereign, became effective October 1, 1981.
Section 768.28(14), Florida Statutes (1981).
However, since compliance with Section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1981),1 is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit and performance of this condition should be alleged in the complaint in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(c), Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022-1023 (Fla.1979), appellees could not institute suit on their cause of action until December 11, 1981, when they were notified by the Department of Insurance that their claim was denied.
Thus, we find that appellees’ cause of action did not accrue until December 11, 1981, after the effective date of Section 768.28(1). See Burleigh House Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 368 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979) and cases cited therein.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss and/or abate is AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and LARRY G. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1981), provides as follows:
(6) An action shall not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality, presents such claim in writing to the Department of Insurance, within 3 years after such claim accrues and the Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing. The failure of the Department of Insurance or the appropriate agency to make final disposition of a claim within 6 months after it is filed shall be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section ....
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Dep't OF Transp. v. Paige Soldovere, 519 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1988)…Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1956); 35 Fla.Jur.2d Limitations and Laches § 48 (1982). This rule applies whether the action is against a private party or the state. See § 768.28(5), Fla.Stat. (1981). In Keith v. Dykes, 430 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), however, the district court held that causes of action against the director of the Division of Drivers Licenses did not accrue until the Department of Insurance notified claimants that their claims were denied. The court reasone…
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Kropff v. Dep't OF Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 530 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1988)…PER CURIAM. This Court accepted jurisdiction to review State, Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Kropjf, 514 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), in which the district court acknowledged direct conflict with Keith v. Dykes, 430 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), and with Department of Transportation v. Soldovere, 452 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 458 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1984). Thereafter, this Court, in Department of Transportation v. Sold-overe, 519 So. 2d 616 (Fla.1988), quashe…
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Dep't OF Transp. v. Paige Soldovere, 452 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ction 768.28(1) was not applicable because Soldovere’s cause of action accrued before the effective date of the statute (1 October 1981). Sold-overe contested the motion, but did not raise the issue subsequently raised and decided in Keith v. Dykes, 430 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); namely, that Section 768.-28(1) did apply because a cause of action does not accrue until the Department of Insurance or the affected agency denies or is deemed to have denied the claim in writing pursuant to Section 768.28(6),…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)
- Burleigh House Condo., Inc. v. Buchwald, 368 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)