EMERGENCY ONE, INC., AND TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., APPELLANTS,
v.
KENITH V. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE
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Emergency One, Inc. and Travelers Insurance appealed an award of temporary disability compensation benefits to an injured worker. The court affirmed, holding that a claimant may receive temporary disability benefits after reaching maximum medical improvement if evidence shows reversion to a temporary disability condition, and that such determinations depend on the substance of medical evidence rather than labels applied by the treating physician.
A claimant may be awarded temporary disability compensation benefits after reaching maximum medical improvement if evidence demonstrates reversion to temporary disability. The determination of MMI status for compensation purposes must be based on the substance of the physician's testimony and findings, not merely the label or formal designation applied by the treating physician.
[1] An employee may be awarded compensation for temporary total disability after an award of permanent partial disability has been made for the same injury.
[2] A physician's determination of maximum medical improvement is not determinative for compensation purposes; the deputy commissioner must make that determination based on t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[The Act] does not prescribe that they must occur in any specific order ... [therefore] we now subscribe to the view that an employee may be awarded compensation for temporary total disability after an award of permanent partial disability has been made for the same injury”
Establishes that disability benefits need not occur in a specific sequence under workers' compensation law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 22, 1981, the claimant's treating physician released him for work without limitations, establishing that date as maximum medical improvement (M…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
We affirm the award of temporary disability compensation benefits in this case because the evidence supports a finding, though improperly articulated in the order, that claimant reverted to a condition of temporary disability subsequent to the initial date of maximum medical improvement recognized in the order. In Smitty’s Coffee Shop v. Florida Industrial Commission, 86 So. 2d 268 (Fla.1956), the Court pointed out the four classes of disability benefits defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act and noted that:
[The Act] does not prescribe that they must occur in any specific order ... [therefore] we now subscribe to the view that an employee may be awarded compensation for temporary total disability after an award of permanent partial disability has been made for the same injury-
id. at 270. The holding in Smitty’s is not limited to situations in which the claimant is recovering from post-MMI remedial surgery. See Acousti Engineering Co. v. Shivers, 391 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).1
The record in this case shows that on May 22, 1981, claimant’s treating physician released him for work without limitations, and the order recognizes that date as maximum medical improvement. After examinations in early June the physician modified his recommendation, prescribed certain therapy, and limited claimant to “light duty” work, noting that the restrictions were temporary. The physician concluded against technical modification of the prior date set by him as MMI, but for compensation purposes that determination is clearly one to be made by the deputy based on the substance of the physician’s testimony and not the label applied by him to claimant’s condition.2 Claimant was properly found to be experiencing temporary disability caused by a compensable accident and should be compensated accordingly, based on the deputy’s determination of diligent work search for the periods in question.
The order should be considered amended to reflect termination of MMI status at the time temporary benefits were reinstated, and as amended the award is affirmed.
JOANOS, J., concurs.
SHIVERS, J., dissents without opinion.
. The circumstances in the present case present no necessity for consideration of when an award of temporary benefits, after final adjudication of MMI, may constitute a modification of the prior order. Cf., Clyatt Memorial, Inc. v. Scott, 394 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Neither does the present appeal involve inconsistent findings which cannot be reconciled by reference to the record. Cf., Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Godwin, 394 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Dan’s Plumbing v. Smith, 410 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
. Dr. Freed continued to treat claimant regularly, and on December 11, 1981 (apparently the last visit before the hearing), he noted that claimant “has a chronic strain, but without neurological involvement and ultimate prognosis remains good.”
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Keller Kitchen Cabinets & Alexis, Inc. v. Holder, 586 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…tor Inns, 457 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 19894); Atkins v. Greenhut Construction Co., 447 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners v. Roberson, 500 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Emergency One, Inc. v. Williams, 431 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). While the claimants apparently proceeded under section 449.28 in those cases, nothing in the statutory language of chapter 440 required that they do so. Just as the cases recognizing the right to further remedial medical treatme…1 / 2
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Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. & United Self-insured Servs. v. Melman, 721 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…ed her chiropractors’ advice not to work. See § 440.15(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). This is not a case where the judge of compensation claims erroneously decided upon a premature date of maximum medical improvement. Cf. Emergency One, Inc. v. Williams, 431 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The parties have, indeed, stipulated to maximum medical improvement as of a date nearly a year before the first period in question. Under these circumstances, Ms. Melman is not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Se…
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Palm Beach Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Roberson, 500 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…because of an unanticipated reversion to a condition of temporary disability arising from the original compensable event, an award which may be achieved even after a finding of MMI and the grant of PPD benefits. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Williams, 431 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Thus, we reject the assertion by Palm Beach that the 1985 proceeding resulted in the claimant accomplishing the relitigation of MMI and PPD which had been resolved in the 1980 order; hence, res judicata, estoppel and law of the…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dep't OF Offender Rehab. & Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Bertie Mae Godwin, 394 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Dan's Plumbing & CNA Ins. v. Smith, 410 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Smitty's Coffee Shop & Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 86 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1956)
- Acousti Eng'g Co. OF Fla. v. Shivers, 391 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Clyatt Mem'l, Inc. v. Havina Scott, 394 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)