FLOOKER T. ADAMS D/B/A F.A. HOME IMPROVEMENT, APPELLANT,
v.
KENT INSURANCE COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Flooker Adams appealed a dismissal of his declaratory judgment action seeking insurance coverage for water damage to a hotel roof during repair work. The trial court held that rainfall cannot constitute an 'accident-occurrence' under the insurance policy as a matter of law, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the complaint's allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
The court reversed the dismissal, holding that the complaint's allegations, which follow the language of the insurance policy and describe a sudden and unexpected rainstorm, are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court held that rainfall is not categorically excluded as a matter of law from constituting an 'accident-occurrence' under a liability insurance policy.
[1] For purposes of a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint are deemed admitted and the trial court must assume all facts alleged as true.
[2] A complaint alleging property damage caused by a sudden, unusual, and unexpected rainstorm, which follows the language of an insurance policy defining "occurrence" as an…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“For purposes of a motion to dismiss, all well pleaded allegations are deemed admitted and the trial court must assume all facts alleged in the complaint as true.”
Establishes the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss—all allegations must be taken as true.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAdams was repairing the Tyler Hotel's roof when a sudden, unusual, and unexpected rainstorm developed while a portion of the roof had no protective co…
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DELL, Judge.
Flooker Adams, d/b/a F.A. Home Improvement, appeals from a final judgment of dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a cause of action against Kent Insurance Company.
Appellant filed an action for a declaratory judgment requiring appellee to provide coverage under a manufacturers’ and contractors’ liability insurance policy. The Tyler Hotel had asserted a claim against appellant for water damage sustained while appellant was repairing its roof. The complaint alleged that the damage occurred because “a sudden, unusual and unexpected rainstorm developed at a time when a portion of the hotel’s roof had no protective covering.” The trial court, relying upon Michigan Mutual Liability Company v. G & L Roofing Company, 123 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960), Christ v. Progressive Fire Insurance Co., 101 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) and Midland Construction Co. v. U.S. Casualty Co., 214 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir.1954), found that rainfall could not be construed as an “accident-occurrence” within the meaning of the policy and entered final judgment in favor of appellee. We reverse.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, all well pleaded allegations are deemed admitted and the trial court must assume all facts alleged in the complaint as true. Hammonds v. Buckeye Cellulose Corporation, 285 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla.1973). The subject policy expressly stated that an
“Occurrence” means an accident including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
The allegations of appellant’s complaint follow the language of appellee’s insurance policy and we hold them sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
None of the cases cited by the trial court hold that rainfall, as a matter of law, cannot constitute an accident or occurrence under a liability insurance policy. Each case turned on a factual determination as to the unexpected nature of the rainfall.
Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DOWNEY and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Hammonds v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 285 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1973)
- Christ v. Progressive Fire Ins. Co., 101 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Midland Const. Co., Inc. v. United States Cas. Co., 214 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954)
- Mich. Mut. Liab. Co. v. G. & L. Roofing Co., 123 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)