JAMES ROBERT NOE, II, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHLEEN J. NOE, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1983-04-27
No. 82-1651
DANAHY and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
431 So. 2d 657 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1983) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this marital dissolution appeal, the husband challenges provisions requiring him to maintain a $50,000 life insurance policy with his ex-wife as beneficiary and to transfer an automobile titled to his corporation. The court affirms most of the judgment but remands two issues for clarification of the trial court's intent regarding the life insurance provision and to address the invalid transfer of corporate property.


Holding

The court affirmed most of the judgment but remanded the life insurance issue because it was uncertain whether the trial court intended it as lump sum alimony or improperly as post-death alimony. The court reversed and vacated the automobile provision because the corporation was not joined as a party and the trial court lacked authority to order transfer of its property; on remand, the husband must provide equivalent $3,000 transportation. All other points were affirmed.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may award life insurance as lump sum alimony to ensure equitable distribution of marital property or to provide for a spouse's continuing support needs.

[2] A requirement to maintain life insurance payable to a spouse upon the obligor's death may be improper if it effectively constitutes alimony payable after death, which is…

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Key Quotes

“Lump sum alimony may be awarded as a means of insuring an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage...or to provide for the wife's further needs for continuing support”

Establishes the permissible purposes for lump sum alimony, distinguishing it from improper post-death alimony obligations.

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Facts & Procedural History

The husband and wife divorced, and the trial court awarded the wife permanent periodic alimony of $21,000 per year (terminable on her death or remarri…

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Opinion of the Court
BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.

BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.

James Robert Noe II (the husband) appeals portions of the final judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Kathleen J. Noe (the wife) as modified on rehearing. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

One of the provisions of the judgment that the husband challenges is the requirement that he maintain in effect unencumbered an existing life insurance policy in the face amount of $50,000 and leave the wife as designated beneficiary until his child support ($2500 per year per minor child) and alimony (permanent periodic alimony of $21,000 per year terminable on the wife’s death or remarriage) obligations terminate. The husband relies on Mahan v. Mahan, 415 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), wherein this court held that a requirement that a husband maintain life insurance under such circumstances as these is, in effect, a requirement that he pay alimony at death, which is improper since an obligation to pay permanent periodic alimony terminates on the obligor’s death. We conclude that Mahan is not necessarily controlling here, since the facts in the case before us suggest that the trial court may have intended this provision as lump sum alimony. Lump sum alimony may be awarded as a means of insuring an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage, Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), or to provide for the wife’s further needs for continuing support, Grobard v. Grobard, 382 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

The trial court availed itself of this means of achieving a fair division of assets in the instant case, awarding the wife certain items of real and personal property as lump sum alimony, due undoubtedly to the fact that much of the parties’ assets were tied up in the husband’s solely owned businesses, which the trial court clearly did not feel could be sold or divided without destroying or drastically reducing the income producing value of the businesses.

However, the trial court may have felt that its designated lump sum awards were insufficient to fully balance the equities between the parties or to provide for the wife’s future needs. If so, the trial court’s life insurance solution was not unreasonable. Stith v. Stith, 384 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).

Because we are uncertain as to the trial court’s intent as to this provision, we remand on this point. On remand, the trial court may take additional evidence or entertain further argument. Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

Should the trial court determine on remand that the $50,000 face value of the life insurance policy in question should be awarded to the wife as lump sum alimony with the premium payments to be made by the husband as additional permanent periodic alimony, the actual ownership of the policy should be awarded to the wife subject to the conditions set out in Stith, supra, at 321. These conditions will, inter alia, ensure that the policy will not be permitted to lapse, whether inadvertently or intentionally, without the wife’s having received sufficient advance notice to avoid such lapse.

One other point raised by the husband has merit. One of the assets awarded to the wife as lump sum alimony was the automobile she had been driving, which was titled in the name of one of the husband’s corporate businesses. Inasmuch as the corporation was not joined as a party to the dissolution proceedings, the trial court did not have the authority to order the property transfer in question, and this provision is therefore vacated. Feldman v. Feldman, 390 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). On remand, the trial court shall require the husband to provide the wife with equivalent transportation, i.e., a $3,000 automobile.

We find the remaining points raised by the husband to be without merit.

Accordingly, the final judgment of dissolution is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DANAHY and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Keller v. Keller, 521 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
    …mself. This corporation was not joined as a party and, thus, the trial court had no power to transfer this corporate asset. Feldman, 390 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). See also Ashourian v. Ashourian, 483 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Noe v. Noe, 431 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). We find no abuse of discretion in the award of permanent, periodic alimony. See Laman v. Laman, 490 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 500 So. 2d 544 (Fla.1986); Neumann v. Neumann, 413 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). How…
  • Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …rty acquired during the marriage.” Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201. See also Philipose v. Philipose, 431 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (upholding award of lump sum alimony made in an effort to make an equitable division of marital assets); Noe v. Noe, 431 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (lump sum alimony may be awarded as means of ensuring an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage). Judges and lawyers, at least in loose discussion, continue to rely upon the concept of lump sum alimony as…
  • Pipitone v. Pipitone, 23 So. 3d 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …ntempt if intended for support rather than property settlement). Equitable Distribution or Support Lump sum alimony may provide for equitable distribution of property or for support. Miulli v. Miulli, 832 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Noe v. Noe, 431 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The remedies available to enforce payment depend on the characterization of the alimony. “Alimony payments [for support], even though they be lump sum payable in installments, are enforceable by contempt proceedings.” Englis…

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