TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT E. MCCLURE, APPELLEE
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Travelers Indemnity Company appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment allowing an insured to stack uninsured motorist coverage across multiple family members' auto policies. The court affirmed stacking on three vehicles but reversed as to the insured's college-student son, finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the son remained a household member.
The court held that McClure was entitled to stack coverage on his own vehicle, his wife's vehicle, and son Martin's vehicle as a matter of law because he qualified as a family member residing in the same household. However, regarding son Robert III, the court held there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he remained a household member despite living year-round in Gainesville and registering to vote there.
[1] A person residing in the same household with relatives is considered a "family member" for purposes of stacking uninsured motorist coverage, even if their vehicle is prin…
[2] A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether a college student residing in a different city and registered to vote there remains a member of their family's h…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court correctly concluded that appellee was a "family member," that is, a person residing in the same household with these relatives, notwithstanding that his automobile, for business reasons, was principally garaged elsewhere.”
Establishes the standard for qualifying as a household member for uninsured motorist stacking—actual residence in same household is determinative despite separate garaging for business reasons.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert E. McClure sought to stack uninsured motorist coverage on automobiles owned by himself, his wife, and his son Martin (where he was clearly a ho…
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PER CURIAM.
We discern no error in the trial court’s finding that as a matter of law the appellee is entitled to stack the uninsured motorist coverage on his automobile, the automobile of his wife, and the automobile of his son Martin, since upon the undisputed facts, the court correctly concluded that appellee was a “family member,” that is, a person residing in the same household with these relatives, notwithstanding that his automobile, for business reasons, was principally garaged elsewhere. Compare General Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Broxsie, 239 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), with Puente v. Arroyo, 366 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
However, with respect to the court’s finding that appellee’s son Robert III, a college student at Gainesville, Florida, is a member of the same household as appellee, so as to permit stacking on Robert Ill’s policy, there is a genuine issue of material fact, see American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 415 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Williams, 375 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Smith, R.P., Jr., J., dissenting from denial of rehearing), as to whether this son, who apparently lived in Gainesville year-round and had registered to vote there, continued nonetheless to be a member of his family’s household in Miami with the intention to return thereto. We have examined the other points raised by the appellant and find them to be without merit.
The summary final judgment is reversed insofar as it permits the appellee to stack the uninsured motorist coverage on the automobile of his son Robert III; in all other respects, it is affirmed.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Gen. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Gertrude Delores Broxsie, 239 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Puente v. Arroyo, 366 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 375 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Shaughn C. Bennett, 415 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)