PEGGY L. PARKER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE LOWER FLORIDA KEYS HOSPITAL DISTRICT, D/B/A FLORIDA KEYS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A hospital obtained summary judgment against a medical malpractice plaintiff at a pretrial conference based on uncontroverted affidavits from hospital administrators. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant's motion violated procedural notice requirements and that the hospital failed to conclusively establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact, particularly because the plaintiff's expert testimony was not before the court.
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the defense motion violated the notice requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c) and that the defendant failed to establish conclusively the absence of genuine issues of material fact. A party need not be prepared to present all evidence at a pretrial conference to avoid adverse summary judgment, and summary judgment at pretrial is proper only when issues have been narrowed to questions of law or when the non-moving party agrees all necessary facts are before the court.
[1] A motion for summary judgment must comply with notice requirements, even when raised at a pretrial conference.
[2] A trial court may enter summary judgment on its own motion at a pretrial conference, but not when the motion is made by a party and lacks proper notice.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“First, the motion for summary judgment clearly was not a court motion but a defense motion, which failed to comply with the notice requirements of the summary judgment rule.”
Establishes that the hospital's motion violated procedural notice requirements under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c), independent of the merits.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action against a hospital in April 1980 regarding the hospital's decision to allow a physician to join and r…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Medical Malpractice cases and more on FLexlaw
FERGUSON, Judge.
This appeal is brought from a summary final judgment entered for the defendant/hospital at a pretrial conference..
Appellant/plaintiff commenced this medical malpractice action in April, 1980, and issues were joined when the hospital filed its answer in August, 1980. On April 17, 1981, the court entered an order setting the cause for pretrial conference on May 11th and for trial in June, 1981. At the pretrial conference, the court and counsel for the plaintiff were given defendant’s motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits. Plaintiff objected to a hearing on the motion for the reasons that notice had not been given as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c);1 objected to a ruling on the motion because the testimony of its listed expert was not part of the record; opposed granting of the hospital’s motion on the merits because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Defendant/hospital argued successfully that (1) pursuant to the pretrial rule (Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.200), a trial court may enter summary judgment on its own motion at a pretrial conference, and (2) the uncontroverted affidavits of two hospital administrators established that the hospital’s actions, in allow ing the defendant/physician to join and remain on its staff, did not fall below the standard of care in the medical community. The trial court entered summary judgment for the hospital on the ground that the record contained no evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital which contradicted the “no-negligence” affidavits of the administrators. We reverse.
First, the motion for summary judgment clearly was not a court motion but a defense motion, which failed to comply with the notice requirements of the summary judgment rule. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(c); Moseley v. Bi-Lo Supermarket, Inc., 341 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Babb v. Lincoln Auto Finance Co., 133 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
Second, there is no requirement that a plaintiff, in order to avoid an adverse summary judgment at pretrial conference, be prepared to produce all the evidence which she expects to present at trial. In those few cases where summary judgment entered at pretrial conference has been upheld, the issues had been narrowed to a question of law, e.g., Roberts v. Braynon, 90 So. 2d 623 (Fla.1956) (where complaint, in action for injuries sustained by plaintiff while riding in automobile driven by defendant, alleged simple negligence only and plaintiffs deposition and minutes of pretrial conference showed facts which would avoid the effect of automobile guest statute, court was confronted with pure question of law), or it was agreed by the non-moving party that the court had before it all the facts necessary for a factual determination, e.g., Raphael v. Koretzky, 102 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958) (complaint and plaintiffs recitation at pretrial conference of what he expected to prove at trial failed to demonstrate facts constituting negligent acts). Here, the plaintiff had listed an expert who would testify as to the hospital’s negligence, but whose testimony was not before the court.2 Defendant/hospital was aware of that testimony because the witness had been deposed in an earlier medical mediation proceeding.3 Without attributing underhanded motives to the moving party, we hold merely that, on this record, defendant has failed to establish conclusively that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Lora v. Maulé Industries, Inc., 235 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510 provides in part:
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued and shall be served at least twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits prior to the day of hearing.
. Defendant chose not to depose any of the plaintiffs expert witnesses.
. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.330(a) provides:
(6) If a civil action is afterward brought, all depositions lawfully taken in a medical liability mediation proceeding may be used in the civil action as if originally taken for it.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Brock v. G.D. Searle & Co., 530 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…t based on a motion which fails to comply with the 20-day notice requirement. Fruhmorgen v. Watson, 490 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Marlar v. Quincy State Bank, 463 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Parker v. Lower Florida Keys Hospital District, 432 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Muncey v. Star Brite Distributors, Inc., 378 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Moreover, cases involving alleged fraud are ordinarily not to be determined by summary judgment as they almost invariably involve a jury question as to…
-
Gold v. EL Camino Mortg. Corp., 491 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…eclosure and Sale entered after the court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Lazar v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); see Cleveland Trust Co. v. Foster, 93 So. 2d 112 (Fla.1957); Parker v. Lower Florida Keys Hospital District, 432 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.…
-
E & I, Inc. v. Excavators, Inc., 697 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ule 1.510(c). See Wizikowski v. Hillsborough County, 651 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Norton v. Gibson, 532 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Brock v. G.D. Searle & Co., 530 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Parker v. Lower Florida Keys Hosp. Dist., 432 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In each of these cases, however, there was an objection. In Vandyk v. Sowthside Gun, Inc., 638 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the first district reversed the granting of a motion for summary judgment, but noted that there was n…
Authorities Cited
- Roberts v. Braynon, 90 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1956)
- Babb v. Lincoln Auto Fin. Co., 133 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Raphael v. Koretzky, 102 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Moseley v. Bi-Lo Supermarket, Inc., 341 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Wenceslao Manuel Lora v. Maule Indus., Inc., 235 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)