GREGORY DWAYNE HANNAH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile appellant was convicted of armed robbery after a Pizza Hut employee identified him as the masked gunman. The court reversed because it improperly denied cross-examination of the key eyewitness to establish bias or prejudice stemming from a conflict between the witness and the appellant's cousin, violating the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
The trial court committed constitutional error in denying cross-examination to impeach witness credibility by showing bias. All witnesses are subject to cross-examination to discredit them by showing bias, prejudice, or interest, particularly key witnesses. Denial of effective cross-examination violates the Sixth Amendment and requires reversal unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
[1] A defendant has the right to cross-examine a key prosecution witness to show bias or prejudice, even if the bias stems from an incident involving a family member of the a…
[2] Denial of effective cross-examination to show witness bias is a constitutional error requiring reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“All witnesses are subject to cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting them by showing bias, prejudice or interest, and this is particularly so where a key witness is being cross-examined.”
Establishes the fundamental right to cross-examine witnesses, especially key prosecution witnesses, to show bias or prejudice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo armed men, one masked, robbed a Pizza Hut and took money from employee Moneypenny under threat of force. Moneypenny identified appellant as the ma…
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FERGUSON, Judge.
Appellant, a juvenile, raises as an issue in this appeal whether reversible error was committed by prohibiting the cross-examination of a key state witness for the purpose of showing bias or prejudice.
The evidence showed that two armed men, one of whom was masked, entered the Pizza Hut and took money from Moneypen-ny, an employee, under the threat of force. Moneypenny identified appellant as the masked robber. At trial, appellant attempted to cross-examine Moneypenny regarding an incident between appellant’s cousin and Moneypenny, which purportedly would show a vengeful motive for having named appellant as one of the robbers; the cross-examination was not permitted. The court further granted the state’s motion in limine to prohibit appellant’s cousin from testifying as to that same event. The testimony, as proffered, would have shown, by cross-examination of Moneypenny, or direct examination of the cousin Jones, that Jones, as a co-worker of Moneypenny, had once accused Moneypenny of stealing money from the employer, and that their relationship had soured, spilling over to appellant whom Moneypenny knew well as Jones’ cousin.
All witnesses are subject to cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting them by showing bias, prejudice or interest, and this is particularly so where a key witness is being cross-examined. D.C. v. State, 400 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Webb v. State, 336 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). It makes no difference that the bias or prejudice stems from an incident involving the state witness and a family member of the accused rather than the accused himself, as long as the evidence tends to establish that the witness is appearing for any reason other than to tell the truth. D.C. v. State; Johnson v. State, 338 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).1
The sixth amendment right to confrontation of witnesses requires that a defendant in a state criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination to show bias. Denial of effective cross-examination in such circumstances is constitutional error, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Moreno v. State, 418 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), requiring reversal unless error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981); Harrell v. State, 405 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Moneypenny and another employee of the Pizza Hut, Reichartt, were acquainted with appellant because he was a daily visitor who sometimes helped with the work. Both employees identified appellant as the gunman in the stocking mask. But because the identification by Reichartt, who is also a friend of Moneypenny, was simply “that’s him”, without testimony as to what features or characteristics she relied upon to aid in the identification, we cannot say that the limitation on cross-examination was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. The state relies on Bailey v. State, 411 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), where the issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting a defendant, charged with the shooting death of his six-year-old child, to cross-examine his wife, the state’s main witness, concerning her recent infidelities. The appellate court held, “[i]t was ... reasonable for the trial judge to consider as too tenuous the notion that appellant’s wife within two and one-half hours after her youngest child was shot in her arms, concocted and so convincingly narrated such a twisted tale.... ” We disagree with the majority opinion that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to permit the cross-examination but agree that reversal was not required for the reasons expressed by Judge Hurley in a concurring opinion — “due to the overwhelming cumulative proof of guilt, ... the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 411 So. 2d at 1380.
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Rondy Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…ghter’s boyfriend. The fifth district reversed, holding that this inquiry properly went to the daughter’s motiva [*893] tion to retaliate against her father because of his desire to eliminate the boyfriend as a friend. Similarly, in Hannah v. State, 432 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), a witness identified a defendant as the robber of a Pizza Hut. The court found reversible error in the refusal to allow evidence that the defendant’s cousin had once accused the eyewitness of stealing, an incident which supplied…
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O'Hara v. State, 642 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…yde’s children. Because defense counsel is entitled to explore the prior dealings between defendant and the state’s witness which might show bias, prejudice, or improper motive, it was error to limit the questioning of this witness. Hannah v. State, 432 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). On retrial, defense counsel is entitled to a thorough examination of the witness. The other pertinent issue concerns the jury instructions. Mr. O’Hara felt the standard jury instruction on disorderly conduct should be limited. H…
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Tomengo v. State, 864 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…key witness on whose credibility the State’s case relies. Id. Evidence of bias, prejudice or interest is admissible as long as it tends to establish that a witness is appearing for any reason other than just to tell the truth. See Hannah v. State, 432 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). A defendant, as a matter of right, may cross-examine a State witness with respect to his motive, interest, or animus, which is connected to the cause or to the parties to the cause. See Sweet v. State, 235 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 2d…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974)
- Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981)
- Webb v. State, 336 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Moreno v. State, 418 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Doyle Harold Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Causey Harrell v. State, 405 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- D. C. v. State, 400 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Bailey v. State, 411 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Johnson v. State, 338 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)