IN THE INTEREST OF T.G.T., A CHILD. STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICIA STALEY, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1983-06-01
No. AF-93
JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
433 So. 2d 11 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1983) Positive Treatment
Cited by 11 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services appealed an order finding a young child dependent and directing HRS to initiate permanent commitment proceedings. The court held that circuit judges have statutory authority under Florida law to order permanent commitment in dependency cases, and affirmed the lower court's decision while requiring proper notice to interested parties before implementation.


Holding

The legislature has expressly granted circuit courts the power to order permanent commitment of a child in dependency proceedings. The court affirmed the order requiring HRS to begin permanent commitment proceedings, but interpreted the order as requiring proper notice to interested parties as required by statute and due process.


Headnotes

[1] A circuit court has the statutory power to initiate permanent commitment proceedings on its own motion in a dependency proceeding.

[2] Permanent commitment is an appropriate disposition for a child abandoned by a parent whose whereabouts are unknown and who has not contributed to the child's support.

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Key Quotes

“the legislature has expressly given the circuit court this power and, therefore, affirm”

Establishes that courts have statutory authority to order permanent commitment in dependency cases

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Facts & Procedural History

T.G.T., nearly four years old, was left with a maternal aunt and uncle at age one with permission to keep the child. The mother provided only an initi…

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Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Judge.

MILLS, Judge.

The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) appeals an order finding T.G.T. to be dependent and directing HRS to begin permanent commitment proceedings.

T.G.T., now almost four years old, was left with a maternal aunt and uncle when one year old. The aunt and uncle were told they could keep the child. Except for an initial $40, the mother has not contributed to the child’s support. The mother visited three times during the first six months of the child’s stay with the aunt and uncle and has not visited the child since. Her current whereabouts are unknown. The father’s identity is unknown.

HRS brought dependency proceedings which resulted in the appealed order. The issue before us is whether a circuit judge may on his own motion initiate permanent commitment proceedings in a dependency proceeding. We hold that the legislature has expressly given the circuit court this power and, therefore, affirm.

At the outset we observe that permanent commitment is an appropriate disposition under these facts, Interest of C.M.H., 413 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Section 39.41, Florida Statutes (1981), sets out the power of the court after adjudicating a child dependent. Subsection 39.41(l)(f) provides that the court may order the permanent commitment of the child. This subsection standing alone would have authorized the actual permanent commitment of T.G.T. without further proceedings.

However, subsection 39.41(3), as well as due process, requires notice be given to a variety of interested persons. That notice was not given in the case before us.

We interpret the order below as requiring HRS to give the proper notice. Compare Interest of M.A.S., 398 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). There is no doubt that the circuit judge acted properly in requiring that notice be given.

We are not convinced by HRS’s “parade of horribles.” Should T.G.T.’s mother become rehabilitated, she may petition for adoption. The permanent commitment will not prevent the adoption, Green v. HRS, 412 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

No HRS employee will be required to falsely swear to a personal belief that the commitment is in the child’s manifest best interest. An allegation that the court has determined that permanent commitment is in the manifest best interest of the child will be sufficient.

AFFIRMED.

JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, 673 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1996)
    …on succinctly summarizes the situation before us: The issue properly before the adoption judge was whether the natural father has been sufficiently “rehabilitated” so that he may now contest for the adoption of his child. See In Interest of T.G.T., 433 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We are required by our earlier decision to recognize that the father was derelict in failing to pay medical bills for the birth of his child and support for the child (even though the mother admits that she led him to believe s…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …n 30 days. HRS urges that the court had no jurisdiction to order it to file a petition for permanent commitment, primarily because of the doctrine of separation of powers. We must reject this argument in light of our recent opinion in In re T.G.T., 433 So. 2d 11, (Fla. 1st DCA, 1983), which held that the court had the statutory power to so act. Faced in T.G.T. with a factual situation similar to that before us, we there stated: The issue before us is whether a circuit judge may on his own motion initiate p…
  • Y.H. v. F.L.H. and K.W.H., 784 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
    …lishing new rights to his or her child through independent adoption proceedings. Section 68.042(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992) allows an unmarried adult to adopt, including the birth parent of the person to be adopted. See, e.g., In re T.G.T., 433 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (permitting mother of child who was permanently committed in a dependency proceeding to petition for adoption of her child upon rehabilitation); Green v. State Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 412 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 3d DCA…

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