GERARD MARCEL BRUNELLE, APPELLANT,
v.
C.L. NORVELL, SHERIFF OF ST. LUCIE COUNTY, APPELLEE
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Gerard Marcel Brunelle sought a writ of habeas corpus to resist extradition to another state. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition, holding that Brunelle failed to overcome the presumption that he was the person named in the rendition warrant and that the foreign executive's demand sufficiently alleged his presence in the demanding state.
Brunelle did not overcome the presumption of identity based on the matching name, and the affidavits were sufficient under Florida Statutes Section 941.03, which requires the foreign executive's demand (not the affidavits themselves) to allege the accused's presence in the demanding state.
[1] An identity of names between a defendant and the name in a rendition warrant creates a presumption that the defendant is the person named in the warrant.
[2] Affidavits supporting an extradition demand need not aver the accused's presence in the demanding state; the foreign executive's demand must so allege.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“appellant did not overcome the presumption that he is the person named in the rendition warrant which arises from an identity of names”
Establishes the legal standard for identity in extradition cases based on matching names
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrunelle filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to resist extradition. He challenged the sufficiency of affidavits supporting the extradition, arg…
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DELL, Judge.
Appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking to resist extradition. We affirm the trial court’s discharge of the petition. First, appellant did not overcome the presumption that he is the person named in the rendition warrant which arises from an identity of names. Solano v. State, 417 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Second, appellant contends that the affidavits do not constitute competent evidence of his presence in the demanding state, because they contain hearsay. Section-941.03, Florida Statutes (1981) does not require the affidavits to aver that an accused was present in the demanding state. It requires the foreign executive’s demand to so allege. Our Supreme Court recently made a statement of policy in the interpretation of the Florida Uniform Criminal Extradition Act:
Substantial rights of citizens must be protected, but constitutional and statutory provisions relating to interstate extradition must be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose, and courts of one state must avoid a view of their duties so narrow as to afford permanent asylum to offenders against the laws of another state.
State v. Soto, 423 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla.1982), quoting Kansas v. Holeb, 188 Neb. 319, 321-22,196 N.W. 2d 387, 389 (1972). We decline to assist appellant in avoiding extradition by giving a hypertechnical interpretation to the statute. The foreign executive’s demand sufficiently alleged appellant’s presence on the critical date. Testimony introduced by appellant to prove that he was present in Florida on this date does no more than create a conflict in the evidence on the question of his whereabouts. The court’s duty in this situation is to remand him to the custody of the demanding state. Bonazzo v. Michell, 221 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
AFFIRMED.
DOWNEY and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Perrera, 443 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…is the same as that on the warrant the prima facie evidence is not overcome by the mere refusal of the arrested person to admit he or she is the same person named in the warrant and a petition for habeas corpus should be denied. Brunelle v. Norveil, 433 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), Solano v. State, 417 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); State ex rel. Sklaroff v. Purdy, 219 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). [*1017] The order granting the petitions for ha-beas corpus is REVERSED and REMANDED. ORFINGER, C.J., an…
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Josey v. Drew Galloway, 482 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…e prisoner’s presence in the demanding state at the time of the offense (unlike the indictment in the instant case). We agree with the rationale of the Blackburn decision. We note, however, that the fourth district’s decision in Brunelle v. Norvell, 433 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), appears to suggest that a foreign executive’s demand is, standing alone, sufficient competent evidence to create a conflict in the evidence requiring denial of habeas corpus relief. This reading of Brunette, if correct, is not c…1 / 2
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Galloway v. Josey, 507 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1987)…BARKETT, Justice. We have for review Josey v. Galloway, 482 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), certified as in conflict with Brunelle v. Norvell, 433 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We are asked to determine the burden of proof a respondent must bear to overcome an existing presumption that he is a fugitive from justice and therefore subject to extraditi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Soto, 423 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1982)
- Bonazzo v. Michell, 221 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- German Solano v. State, 417 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)