VERNON GASKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Defendant's speedy trial right under Rule 3.191 was not violated when trial was continued beyond 180 days, because defense counsel's statement about difficulty locating the incarcerated defendant constituted an implicit continuance request that justified the delay.
A trial court may properly continue a trial beyond the 180-day speedy trial period when defense counsel's statement about difficulty locating an incarcerated defendant effectively requests a continuance for trial preparation, even without an explicit motion.
[1] A defendant's speedy trial right under Rule 3.191 is not violated by a continuance beyond 180 days when defense counsel's statement regarding difficulty in locating an in…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGaskins was incarcerated in Calhoun County on other charges when his Leon County trial was scheduled. One week before trial, his counsel reported to t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Speedy Trial Right cases and more on FLexlaw
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.
By this appeal Gaskins asserts that his Rule 3.191 right to a speedy trial was violated when his Leon County trial was continued from a date within the 180-day period to a date beyond it. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191. That Gaskins was incarcerated in Calhoun County on other charges, at the time of his originally scheduled trial, cannot of itself have justified an extension of the prescribed period for trial, for ordinarily the duty to produce an incarcerated defendant for trial is the State’s. E.g., Lee v. State, (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) [8 FLW 1151]. Yet Gaskins’ incarceration beyond Leon County presented problems to his counsel in preparation for trial, and one week before the originally scheduled trial Gaskins’ counsel reported to the trial judge:
Well, we [have] a slight problem getting Mr. Gaskins here Monday. I haven’t been able to find him. And I got a call yesterday, our office did, that he was just convicted of grand theft over in Calhoun County and he resides in the Calhoun County Jail. And I haven’t had a chance to go see him.
Gaskins’ counsel made no request that Gas-kins be brought forthwith to Leon County for pretrial preparation. The trial judge responded, “No trial.” In these circumstances, though Gaskins’ counsel did not in terms move for a continuance in order to prepare his defense, the court justifiably regarded counsel’s statement as having that effect, and properly denied the subsequent motion for discharge. See State v. Fraser, 426 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jones v. State, 573 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…a defendant is incarcerated within the jurisdiction of the State of Florida, the state bears the burden of producing him. Pilgrim v. Swanson; Carter v. State, 509 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Robbins v. State; Tirado v. Reese; Gaskins v. State, 433 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Jones’ conviction and sentence are reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions that he be discharged. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SMITH and WOLF, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Fraser, 426 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)